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Paranoia is increasingly considered to be a common phenomenon in the general 
population and is not just a symptom of diagnosable psychiatric disorders. Recently, 
Ellett, Allen-Crooks, Stevens, Wildschut & Chadwick (2013) argued that distrust-based 
competition in the Prisoners Dilemma Game (PDG) is a novel behavioural marker for 
nonclinical paranoia. The present study sought to replicate the finding of Ellett et al. 
(2013) and to extend their research by looking to the social psychology literature on 
human values as additional potential motivations for competition in the PDG. 
Additionally, the study sought to examine relationships between paranoia in the 
nonclinical population and human values, and offer support for a recently refined theory 
of human values (Schwartz et al., 2012).   
Consistent with prediction, higher trait paranoia was associated with valuing 
face, that is, holding a commitment to security and power through maintaining one’s 
public image and avoiding humiliation, and lower trait paranoia was associated with 
valuing universalism-tolerance, that is, showing acceptance and understanding for 
others. Secondly, and consistent with prediction, the current findings replicated that of 
Ellett et al. (2013) to show that distrust-based PDG competition is a behavioural marker 
for nonclinical paranoia. Thirdly, the present research offered a secondary behavioural 
marker for nonclinical paranoia based on a commitment to valuing power. Lastly, the 
study offered support for the circular structure of values in Schwartz’s (2012) refined 
theory.   
Collectively, the current findings provided further evidence for the role of the 
PDG in the measurement and investigation of nonclinical paranoia, and more 
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specifically provided a foundation for further research into the role that values could 
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1.1 Overview of Introduction Chapter 
Researchers over the last 15 years have begun to free paranoia from its association with 
severe mental illness and it is now viewed as a phenomenon to be explained in its own 
right (Freeman, 2007). Indeed, an increasingly large evidence base shows that 
persecutory delusions exist in individuals who do not meet diagnostic criteria for 
psychosis and are viewed as a form of belief that exists on a continuum of normal 
human experience (Strauss, 1969). Additionally, the continuum approach also offers a 
crucial opportunity for the theoretically justified study of paranoia in nonclinical 
populations to inform the understanding of clinical paranoia (e.g., Bebbington et al., 
2013; Combs & Penn, 2004; David, 2010; Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith et al., 
2005).   
In contrast to the literatures’ reliance on self-report measures, recently, an 
experimental paradigm, the Prisoners Dilemma (PDG) has been shown to provide the 
first behavioural measure of nonclinical paranoia (Ellett, Allen-Crooks, Stevens, 
Wildschut & Chadwick, 2013). Specifically, distrust-based competition was associated 
with nonclinical paranoia, and the authors concluded by considering the potential role 
of other motivations for competition on the PDG to be additional novel markers for 
nonclinical paranoia. Given the role of values as determinates of behaviour (Rokeach, 
1973; Schwartz, 1992) this body of literature is explored and offered as a lucrative 
framework for further exploration into the use of the PDG in nonclinical paranoia.  
Based on this empirical and theoretical work, the current thesis aimed to 
replicate and extend research into nonclinical paranoia and values. Firstly, the thesis 
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aimed to explore human values in relation to nonclinical paranoia to provide evidence 
for the explanatory power of values in relation to behaviour and extend the knowledge 
base on Schwartz et al. (2012)’s refined theory of human values. Secondly, the thesis 
aimed to replicate the finding of Ellett et al. (2013) that distrust-based competition on 
the PDG is a behavioural marker for nonclinical paranoia to provide additional 
empirical support for the use of the PDG in this research area. The third aim of the 
current research was to extend the research of Ellett et al. (2013) and broaden our 
understanding of paranoia in the nonclinical population with reference to the social 
psychology literature on human values as potential motivations for competition on the 
PDG. Lastly, the fourth aim was to combine the three areas of research of nonclinical 
paranoia, the PDG and human values theory to establish whether more complex 
interactions between paranoia and values were associated with PDG competition.  
This chapter begins by introducing the categorical and continuous approaches 
to understanding psychosis with a particular focus on theories and models which 
support that paranoia exists on a continuum of normal experience (e.g., Chapman & 
Chapman, 1980; Claridge, 1997; Strauss, 1969). In line with dimensional views of 
paranoia (e.g., Garety & Hemsley, 1994), a definition of persecutory delusions as used 
in the current research is then discussed (Freeman & Garety, 2000). This is followed 
by a review of the literature regarding the prevalence of paranoia in the nonclinical 
population including survey, longitudinal and experimental methodologies. This 
concludes with a discussion relating to the novel behavioral marker of nonclinical 
paranoia of distrust-based competition on the PDG (Ellett et al., 2013). The chapter 
then introduces the human values literature and presents Schwartz et al.’s (2012) model 
of human values. The chapter will conclude by providing a rationale for combining the 
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three literatures on the PDG, values and nonclinical paranoia to inform the hypotheses 
for the current thesis.  
 
1.2 Categorical vs Continuous Approaches to Psychosis and Psychotic Symptoms 
The traditional medical model assumes a categorical view of psychotic symptoms such 
as paranoid delusions in which differences between psychotic symptoms and their 
normal counterparts are considered to be qualitative (Johns & van Os, 2001). Paranoid 
delusions have historically been considered to be discreet and discontinuous and 
therefore were not deemed to be a part of normal healthy psychological functioning 
(Tai & Turkington, 2009).  Historically, this clinical perspective has greatly influenced 
the conceptualisation of psychiatric disorders, with traditional classification systems 
determining the presence (or absence) of mental disorders such as psychosis based on 
whether individuals do (or do not) present with symptoms (John & van Os, 2001).  
However, as early as the late 1960s, Strauss (1969) first challenged the concept that 
paranoid delusions were categorical. As Spitzer (1992) summarizes later, “there is more 
to say about delusions than that they are present or absent” (Freeman & Garety, 2000, 
p.413).   
It is now widely asserted that delusions are not discrete, discontinuous entities 
but instead should be considered as complex, multidimensional phenomena (Garety & 
Hemsley, 1994). Freeman and Garety (2006) endorse the position of Oltmanns (1988) 
who suggests the presence of a delusion is best accomplished by considering a list of 
characteristics or dimensions, none of which alone is necessary or sufficient but that 
with increasing endorsement produces greater agreement on the presence of a delusion. 
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Phenomenological studies show that delusional beliefs, like ordinary beliefs and 
attitudes, vary across a number of dimensions such as their bizarreness, the conviction 
with which they are held, the extent to which the person is preoccupied by them, and 
the extent to which they lead to distress (Garety, Everitt & Hemsley, 1988; Garety & 
Hemsley, 1987; Kendler, Glazer, & Morgenstern, 1983). Indeed, modern classification 
systems, namely the DSM-V (American Psychological Association, 2013) are 
reflecting this shift by acknowledging that the signs and symptoms of psychosis are on 
a continuum with normal mental states (Allardyce, Suppes & van Os, 2007). Although 
this most recent version of the DSM does not go so far as to replace the categorical 
diagnosis of psychiatric disorders, it does attempt to capture this underlying 
dimensional structure of psychotic symptomology within the constraints of a 
categorical system (Heckers et al., 2013). 
 
1.2.1 The Continuum Hypothesis 
The dimensional approach to delusions implies that they might be found, perhaps in a 
less severe form, in people who have not sought or received psychiatric treatment 
(Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001). Current thinking, 
drawing on a large body of support from phenomenological studies, epidemiology, 
developmental psychopathology, and cognitive psychology (e.g., Freeman, Garety, 
Bebbington, Smith et al., 2005; Johns et al., 2004; Kaymaz & van Os, 2010; Linscott 
& van Os, 2010; van Os & Verdoux, 2003) suggests that paranoid delusions, although 
characteristic of psychotic phenomena, may be far more accurately understood as being 
widespread in nonclinical populations with the paranoid beliefs of clinical and 
nonclinical populations existing on a continuum (Chapman & Chapman, 1980; 
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Claridge, 1997; Strauss, 1969).  Delusions in psychosis would represent the severe end 
of a continuum, but such experiences would be present, often to a lesser degree, in the 
general population and would be related to milder, attenuated forms of the experience 
(Freeman, 2006). In accordance with a continuum approach to paranoia, a number of 
studies have attested to shared commonality between risk factors for nonclinical 
symptoms and those in clinical disorders. These include trauma (Spauwen, 
Krabbendam, Lieb, Wittchen & van Os, 2006; van Os, Hanssen, Bijl & Ravelli, 2000), 
excessive cannabis use and alcohol consumption (Henquet, Murray, Linszen, van Os, 
2005; van Os et al., 2000) and urbanicity (Spauwen, Krabbendam, Lieb, Wittchen & 
van Os, 2004).  
 
1.3 Defining Paranoia 
Paranoia is now a term that has moved into the lexicon of everyday language to describe 
commonplace suspiciousness and feelings of mistrust. These milder variants of 
paranoia exist alongside severe paranoia classified by the presence of persecutory 
delusions seen as a defining criteria for psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia 
(Freeman, 2007), bipolar affective disorder (Goodwin & Jamison, 1990) and major 
depression (Haltenhof, Ulrich, & Blanenburg, 1999). Persecutory delusions have been 
notoriously difficult to define (e.g., Garety, 1985; Harper, 1992; Heise, 1988; Jones, 
1999; Strauss, 1969). The implication for empirical research has been that many reports 
of studies have been unclear about the definition of persecutory delusions they utilized, 
leading to concerns regarding whether they are indeed studying the same phenomenon 
(e.g., Freeman, 2007). In a critical commentary, Freeman and Garety (2000) offered a 
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pragmatic resolution by outlining a set of robust criteria for delusions to be classified 
as persecutory. The full criteria are presented in Table 1.1.  
 
Table 1.1. Freeman and Garety’s (2000) criteria for defining persecutory delusions  
Criteria A and B must be met: 
A. The individual believes that harm is occurring, or is going to occur, to him or her 
B. The individual believes that the persecutor has the intention to cause harm 
There are a number of points of clarification: 
I. Harm concerns any action that leads to the individual experiencing distress 
II. Harm only to friends or relatives does not count as a persecutory belief, unless the 
persecutor also intends this to have a negative effect upon the individual 
III. The individual must believe that the persecutor at present or in the future will 
attempt to harm him or her 
IV. Delusions of reference do not count within the category of persecutory beliefs 
 
Crucially, Freeman and Garety (2000) highlight the role of harm and the 
persecutor’s intent as an inherent determinant of whether a delusion can be defined as 
persecutory. Hence, for an individual to be experiencing a persecutory delusion, the 
individual must believe that harm is occurring, or is going to occur, to him or her, and 
that the persecutor has the intention to cause harm. This definition has provided 
confidence that researchers are indeed studying the same phenomenon giving greater 
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clarity for effective theoretical development and greater validity to research output 
(Freeman, 2007). Crucially then, the presence of persecutory delusions does not denote 
mental ill health; Freeman and Garety’s (2000) definition of persecutory delusions is 
not subsumed within a clinical diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder. Rather, their 
definition is in line with theoretical and empirical viewpoints that delusions are 
dimensional and they occur in the general nonclinical population. These criteria have 
been used to define paranoia both in the clinical (e.g., Green et al., 2006) and nonclinical 
(e.g., Ellett, Lopes & Chadwick, 2003) populations and will be used within the current 
research.  
An increasingly large evidence base shows that persecutory delusions exist in 
individuals who do not meet diagnostic criteria for psychosis and are viewed as a form 
of belief that exists on a continuum of normal human experience (Strauss, 1969). 
Additionally, the continuum approach also offers a crucial opportunity for the 
theoretically justified study of paranoia in nonclinical populations to inform the 
understanding of clinical paranoia (e.g., Bebbington et al., 2013; Combs & Penn, 2004; 
David, 2010; Freeman, 2010). Nonclinical samples also allow a reduction in the 
confounding variables likely to alter symptoms such as the use of medication or the 
comorbid presence of secondary illness (David, 2010). They also offer practical 
benefits of easier access to larger samples (Freeman et al., 2010).  
The following section explores the role that anxiety plays in paranoia, after 
which an overview of the prevalence of paranoia in nonclinical populations will be 
provided encompassing prevalence studies (cross-sectional and longitudinal) and 




1.4 The Psychological Understanding of Paranoia and Anxiety 
Cognitive models of persecutory delusions, accounting for their presence across clinical 
and nonclinical populations, have postulated a number of contributory factors including 
anomalous experiences, affective processes, reasoning biases and social factors 
(Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington 2002; Freeman, 2007; Freeman & 
Freeman, 2008; Garety, Bebbington, Fowler, Freeman & Kuipers, 2007). In particular, 
with regards to affective processes, anxiety is consistently argued to be inherent in 
paranoia and is likely to play an important role in the formation and maintenance of 
persecutory delusions (Freeman, Garety & Kuipers, 2001). Freeman et al. 
(2002) examined the role of anxiety in the development of persecutory delusions, and 
proposed that similar themes and processes underlie both. Anxiety is a defensive 
reaction to the anticipation of threat and danger (physical, social or psychological); 
persecutory delusions are characterised by similar themes referring to perceived danger 
or harm from another (Michail & Birchwood, 2009). More specifically, it is 
hypothesized that anxiety is central in the (mis)interpretation of anomalous internal 
events as threatening, thereby leading to the formation of paranoid threat beliefs 
(Freeman et al., 2002).     
In support of these theoretical frameworks, anxiety has repeatedly been found 
to be associated with persecutory delusions using multiple methodologies including 
cross-sectional (e.g., Martin & Penn, 2001), longitudinal (e.g., Freeman et al., 2012) 
and experimental (e.g., Freeman, Pugh, Vorontsova, Antley, & Slater, 2010). For 
example, Lincoln, Peter, Schafer and Moritz (2008) reported that the effect of stress on 
paranoia was mediated by an increase in anxiety, and Freeman, Pugh et al. (2008) found 
that a 10-point increase on a continuous measure of anxiety was associated with over 
twice the risk of paranoia and a 20-point increase was associated with over five times 
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the risk of paranoia. To this end, paranoia can be conceptualised as a type of anxious 
fear (Freeman, Pugh et al., 2008).  
This is a widely held view which the current study also adopts. As such, the 
current study does not aim to provide additional support for this well-established 
relationship. Instead, the thesis primarily aims to make steps towards establishing novel 
relationships between paranoia and additional variables of interest. Consequently, the 
study design did not additionally include a measure of anxiety. The implications of this 
are that the present study cannot provide comment on the potentially explanatory role 
that anxiety may play in understanding and interpreting the findings of this thesis. All 
results and interpretations are made with this caveat in mind; future research could look 
to rectify this by including measures of anxiety. 
 
1.5 Investigating Paranoia in the General Population: Survey Studies 
One of the largest and most robust epidemiological studies was conducted in the 
Netherlands by van Os et al. (2000) from a random sample of 7076 men and women 
aged 18-64 years. Initial data was collected using the Composite International 
Diagnostic Interview (CIDI; World Health Organisation, 1990), with any respondents 
endorsing psychotic symptoms provided with a psychiatrist follow-up interview. 
Crucially, this enabled the Netherland Mental Health Survey and Incidence Study 
(NEMESIS) to systematically examine the severity of delusions through the removal 
of any data provided by an individual who could be diagnosed with a psychiatric 
disorder, and discounting any delusions considered plausible or founded. Using this 
methodology, van Os et al. (2000) found that 1% of their general population had a 
“true” psychiatrist-rated delusion, and still 5.8% had a “clinically not relevant delusion” 
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defined as a belief that does not cause the individual undue distress or induce help-
seeking. They found that plausible symptoms, secondary symptoms, and nonclinically 
relevant symptoms were all very strongly associated with the presence of clinical 
symptoms; evidence that clinical and nonclinical experiences are linked (Freeman, 
2006). The study also found commonality in risk factors (e.g., lower age, urban 
dwelling, and lower quality of life) and functional measures (e.g., depressive symptoms 
and blunting of affect) between individuals with or without psychiatrist-rated 
psychosis. The authors provide this as evidence that the psychosis phenotype as it exists 
in nature may be nearly 50 times more prevalent than it’s purely clinical manifestation. 
This robust research, described as a “landmark study” by Freeman (2006, p. 203) in his 
review of delusions in the nonclinical population, shows very convincingly that 
nonclinical individuals in the general population can experience delusions. It also builds 
on smaller survey studies of the general population in US samples who reported similar 
findings (e.g., Eaton, Romanoski, Anthony, & Nestadt, 1991; Tien & Anthony, 1990).   
Notwithstanding the striking results regarding the frequency of delusions in the 
nonclinical population, it can be argued that not all of the delusions reported by van Os 
et al. (2000) were persecutory in nature. That is, they did not all include the critical 
element of harm that has to be present in the endorsement of a delusion for it to be 
defined as persecutory (Freeman & Garety, 2000). Survey studies of British general 
populations show similar prevalence estimates of delusional beliefs to the European 
and US population based surveys but are perhaps more relevant here because they do 
go further to ensuring that delusions are indeed persecutory.  
Johns et al. (2004) present the prevalence and correlates of self-reported 
psychotic symptoms from data in the second UK National Survey of Psychiatric 
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Morbidity resulting in a large and representative sample of 8560 respondents aged 16-
74 years of age. To ensure a purely nonclinical population, respondents with definite or 
probable psychosis (n = 60) were removed following second-phase interviews using 
the Schedules for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry (SCAN; World Health 
Organisation, 1992). Paranoid thoughts were assessed using the Psychosis Screening 
Questionnaire (PSQ). The study reported that 21% of respondents believed over the 
past year that there were times when people were against them and 9% of respondents 
over the same time period felt that people had deliberately acted to harm them. A much 
smaller percentage, but still 1.5% of the nonclinical representative British sample 
endorsed the striking persecutory delusion that they believed a group of people were 
plotting to cause them serious harm or injury. The authors also present similar risk 
factors shown in their nonclinical population to that of van Os et al. (2000) associated 
with psychotic symptoms. Specifically the results of a multivariate regression analysis 
showed that paranoid thoughts were independently associated with neurotic symptoms, 
victimisation experiences, alcohol dependence, recent stressful life events, average IQ 
and male gender. The authors report on the consistency of their findings with current 
cognitive theories regarding the development and maintenance of psychotic symptoms 
and persecutory delusions (e.g., Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 
2001; Freeman, et al., 2002).  
More recent large-scale survey data from the Adult Psychiatric Morbidity 
Survey in England (APMS 2007; N = 7281) using the Psychosis Screening 
Questionnaire to identify delusional beliefs attests to the reliability of Johns et al.’s 
(2004) results by reporting very similar prevalence and concomitant data (Freeman et 
al., 2011).  However, despite the focus on delusions as persecutory and the recent 
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replication of results, methodological criticisms have been levied at Johns et al. (2004) 
regarding the otherwise rudimental assessment of delusions. Specifically, the measure 
to assess paranoia was a screening questionnaire for psychotic disorder (the PSQ) which 
did not capture the fully dimensional nature of delusions (Freeman, 2006; 2007). 
Additionally the use of lay interviewers may have served to increase the prevalence 
above that ascertained by clinical interview (Wiles et al., 2006). 
To target these limitations, the 2000 British National Psychiatric Morbidity 
Survey has recently been subjected to a secondary analysis which sought to extend the 
results of Johns et al. (2004) to identify structural relationships in what the authors’ 
term, the spectrum of paranoid ideation. In addition to data from the PSQ, Bebbington 
et al. (2013) included data from the questionnaire version of the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV Axis II disorders (SCID-II; First, Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams & 
Benjamin, 1997). They present a confirmatory factor analysis to suggest that paranoia 
in the general population can be subcategorised into four clearly defined factors; 
mistrust, interpersonal sensitivity, ideas of reference and ideas of persecution. 
Bebbington et al. (2013) support persecutory delusions as being the rarest class of 
paranoia which, by virtue of the endorsement of persecutory delusions, almost 
invariably meant that individuals also had the highest rates of other features of paranoia 
(e.g., mistrust, ideas of reference and interpersonal sensitivity) such that the rarer and 
odder thoughts – characteristic of clinical presentations – occurred in tandem with the 
more common and plausible experiences. This non-reflexive relationship between 
paranoia items, that is, where the less frequent, more severe items were relatively more 
predictive of other paranoid items is consistent with previous empirical research (e.g., 
Johns et al., 2004; van Os et al., 2000) and the existence of a continuum of psychotic 
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symptoms in the general population with actual paranoid persecutory delusions being 
placed at the extreme end. Bebbington et al. (2013) also report that nonclinical paranoia 
follows an exponential distribution like that seen with affective symptoms (Meltzer, 
Tom, Brugha, Fryers & Meltzer, 2002) suggestive of a single population distribution, 
and not a bimodal distribution (i.e., between ‘clinical paranoia’ and ‘nonclinical 
paranoia’) further supporting that nonclinical paranoia is a phenomenon on its own right 
(Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith et al., 2005). Overall the authors suggest their 
results support the existence both of the subcategories of paranoia and an underlying 
dimension. Movement between categories and along the dimension indicate the process 
whereby the more extreme forms of paranoia develop, eventually resulting in 
diagnosable psychotic disorders (Bebbington et al., 2013). The authors highlight the 
important role of aetiology to explain exactly why particular people move from 
nonclinical paranoia to clinical paranoia at particular times in their lives. It is possible, 
and likely, that a wide range of factors are implicated including those in the 
psychological domain focused on emotional and cognitive attributes (e.g., Hanssen, 
Bak, Vollebergh & van Os., 2005; Krabbendam et al., 2005), social factors (e.g., 
Wigman et al., 2011) and the role of appraisal (e.g., Garety et al., 2007; Morrison, 
French & Wells, 2007).   
 
1.5.1 Survey Studies in Student Populations 
Survey studies have also focused on nonclinical paranoia in specific populations to 
build upon the multi-dimensional perspective of paranoia and provide a deeper account 
of the phenomenology of nonclinical paranoia deemed lacking from the larger scale 
surveys (Freeman 2006; 2007). Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith et al. (2005) 
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present data from a UK student population (N=1202) using the specifically designed 
Paranoia Checklist (PC) to investigate degree of conviction and distress in addition to 
frequency data for delusional endorsement. Paranoid thoughts occurred regularly in 
approximately a third of the sample. Delusions of a persecutory nature occurred at 
similar levels to previous studies, for example, 8% of the sample held the belief at least 
weekly that someone has it in for them and wanted to cause them harm. As previously 
found, rarer and more implausible paranoid items (e.g., ‘there is a possibility of a 
conspiracy against me’) are held with the strongest levels of conviction and associated 
with the most distress (Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith et al., 2005). More frequent 
and distressing paranoia was associated with becoming isolated, giving up activities, 
and feelings of powerlessness and depression. Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith et 
al., (2005) present a hierarchy of nonclinical paranoia where severe paranoia (such as 
persecutory delusions relating to severe threat to the self) may build upon common 
emotional concerns of mild and moderate threat and social evaluative concerns.   
Additional phenomenological approaches to the prevalence of nonclinical 
paranoia have been taken in student samples. Ellett et al. (2003) used the Paranoia Scale 
(Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) a measure specifically designed to measure the incidence 
of paranoia in a normal college population and the newly developed Personal 
Experience of Paranoia Scale (PEPS) to investigate individual experiences of paranoia 
along a number of cognitive, behavioural, and affective dimensions known to be 
important in clinical paranoia. Within a sample of students (N = 324) aged 18-49, 47% 
reported a clear experience of paranoia as defined by a perception that others acted to 
intentionally harm them psychologically, physically, or both (Freeman & Garety, 
2000). A further 23% reported an experience of paranoia but their descriptions lacked 
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an explicit statement that others acted with malevolent intent. That said, the scores on 
the Paranoia Scale for those 23% were statistically significantly higher than those 
respondents not reporting any paranoia (Ellett et al., 2003). The authors reasoned that 
the true figure of their sample reporting an experience of paranoia is somewhere 
between 47% and 70% of the sample. Results from the 153 instances of clear paranoia 
suggest that paranoia tends to be preoccupying and to have a marked impact on 
subjective sense of wellbeing. The experience of paranoia was characterised by feeling 
both judged negatively by others and powerless to stop what was being done. Anger 
and frustration were the most common affective responses with 69% of respondents 
reporting to feel this way. The results suggest strongly that paranoia is a common 
human experience with negative affective and cognitive consequences (Ellett et al., 
2003).  
Overall, cross-sectional survey studies provide very clear evidence that the 
proportion of paranoia in the general nonclinical population is strikingly high, and that 
the experience of persecutory delusions is a phenomenon best viewed on a continuum 
of normal experience not restricted to clinically diagnosable presentations. Although 
they provide replicated and strong findings, there are, however, some limitations. By 
their very design, survey studies are cross-sectional and consequently do not allow for 
causal associations to be made. As Freeman et al. (2011) acknowledge, although survey 
data may “indicate the presence of some kind of mechanism, the direction of effect 
cannot be substantiated” (p. 933). They suggest the triangulation of more sophisticated 
methodologies involving longitudinal observational studies and experimental 
manipulations that will permit more substantial inferences of causality (Freeman et al., 
2011). The following sections will now detail some noteworthy longitudinal studies 
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and experimental methodologies used in the study of paranoia in nonclinical 
populations.  
 
1.6 Investigating Paranoia in the General Population: Longitudinal Studies 
Longitudinal methods have been used to track the trajectory of psychotic symptoms 
over time, and to investigate whether paranoid beliefs in the nonclinical population can 
be a prodrome for subsequent delusions in clinical populations. The first evidence to 
suggest the importance of nonclinical symptoms in later clinical manifestations was 
reported by Chapman, Chapman, Kwapil, Eckblad and Zinser (1994) who reported high 
rates of psychotic outcomes in individuals who had rated highly on scales of magical 
ideation and perceptual aberration 10 years earlier. These early studies led to more 
robust large-scale longitudinal research which focused more specifically on the 
symptoms of psychosis such as paranoia.  
Poulton et al. (2000) provided the first examination of links between childhood 
and adult symptoms of psychosis. The Dunedin birth cohort tracked psychotic 
symptoms prospectively in a birth cohort of 761 children in New Zealand who were 
asked about delusional beliefs and hallucinatory experiences at age 11 and followed up 
to age 26 years. In comparison to individuals without childhood symptoms, individuals 
who reported more than one psychotic symptom at age 11 where 16 times more likely 
to develop a psychiatric disorder by age 26. In terms of attributable risk, 42% of the 26-
year-olds diagnosed with psychosis had reported one or more psychotic symptoms at 
age 11. This suggests that lower states on the paranoia continuum are indeed a risk 
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factor for more elevated states, and that transitions over the continuum do occur with 
time (Poulton et al., 2000).  
Subsequent studies have also replicated similar results. Hanssen et al. (2005) 
followed up individuals with incident psychotic experiences after two years to identify 
transitions to psychotic disorder. They reported an 8% (i.e., 60-fold) increase in risk 
compared to those without incident psychotic experiences. The 2-year risk rose to 21% 
for those with multiple psychotic experiences, and to 15% for those whose psychotic 
experience had arisen in the context of significant lowering of mood (Hanssen et al., 
2005). Unfortunately Hanssen et al. (2005) do not isolate delusions specifically within 
their research such that psychotic experiences may include other phenomenon such as 
hallucinations and abnormal experiences. Similarly, Poulton et al. (2000) used the 
Diagnostic Interview Schedule for Children (DISC-C; Costello, Edelbrock, Kalas, 
Kessler & Klaric, 1982) for the DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) to 
assess psychotic symptomology at age 11. The presence of psychotic symptoms was 
restricted to only five questions from the schizophrenia subsection of the DISC-C with 
delusions categorised as present when children answered positively to having had an 
experience of people spying on them.  This does not contain the essence of harm 
necessary to meet the criteria of being a persecutory delusion as defined in the same 
year by Freeman and Garety (2000).  
More recently, Wiles et al. (2006) utilise more specific assessments which do 
go a little further to parse out persecutory delusions from delusions which are not 
obviously persecutory and from psychotic symptoms more generally. Wiles et al. 
(2006) present data from an 18-month follow-up of participants in the British National 
Survey of Psychiatric Morbidity. Incident cases were those who endorsed one or more 
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psychotic symptoms at follow-up, who had not done so at baseline to track the trajectory 
of self-reported psychotic symptoms in the British general population. Of the 1965 
participants without psychotic disorders at baseline, 3.3% reported times when they felt 
people were deliberately acting to harm them, and 0.42% expressed beliefs regarding a 
group of people were plotting to cause them serious injury or harm. Paranoid beliefs 
were the most commonly reported of all psychotic symptoms. This supports the notion 
of persecutory delusions as not only a common phenomenon relative to other psychotic 
symptoms, but as a phenomenon that can be newly experienced in individuals who had 
not reported any psychotic symptoms in the preceding 18-month period. The study also 
investigated risk factors for self-reported incident psychotic symptoms. Individuals 
living in rural areas, those who had few close friends or relatives, and those who smoked 
tobacco or drank in a harmful manner had a two to three times greater risk of incident 
psychotic symptoms. The number of adverse life events was also strongly associated 
with onset psychotic symptoms and the effect of each of these risk factors was 
independent (Wiles et al., 2006).  
The results are in common with earlier cross-sectional findings from the British 
National Survey of Psychiatric Morbidity (Johns et al., 2004). The risk factors identified 
for self-reported psychotic symptoms in the general population share some similarities 
with the risk factors of those with diagnosable psychotic disorders attesting to the 
dimensionality of psychotic symptoms. Notably however, Wiles et al. (2006) do not 
separate out the risk factors for individual symptoms. It is therefore impossible to 
disentangle the risk factors specifically for the onset of persecutory delusions as 
separate from the risk factors for other psychotic symptoms they investigated (e.g., 
thought insertion, strange experiences, and hallucinations).   
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Longitudinal studies provide evidence for the presence of nonclinical paranoia 
as a prodrome for clinical paranoia expressed over time. That said, van Os, Linscott, 
Myin-Germeys, Delespaul & Krabbendam (2009) stress that approximately 75–90% of 
developmental psychotic experiences are transitory and do disappear over time. What 
is clearer however, is the frequency of paranoia in the nonclinical population when 
survey studies (cross-sectional and longitudinal) are taken together. Freeman (2006) 
reviewed 15 studies to conclude that there is clear evidence that the rate of delusional 
beliefs in the general population is higher than that of psychotic disorders; delusions 
are reported by those both with, and without, a clinically diagnosed mental illness and 
are not confined to clinical populations. As discussed throughout, the frequency of 
delusional beliefs varies according to the content of the delusion studied, the 
characteristics of the sample (age, level of urbanity, student or general population), and 
research methodologies used (psychiatrist rated, lay-person, interview schedules). That 
withstanding, approximately 1-3% of the nonclinical population have persecutory 
delusions of a severity comparable to clinical cases of psychosis, and 10-15% of the 
nonclinical population have fairly regular paranoia including delusions of a persecutory 
nature (Freeman, 2006).   
 
1.6.1 Limitations of Survey Studies  
Survey studies have a number of limitations. Firstly, in terms of the 
methodological constraints, van Os et al. (2000) highlight that many studies apply 
clinical measures to nonclinical populations. Do these provide reliable estimates of 
symptomology in nonclinical populations? Some of the studies reviewed have 
improved on this and utilised measures specifically designed to assess paranoia in 
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nonclinical samples (e.g., the PS, PC and PEPS), however these measures are still 
reliant on self-report to estimate symptom prevalence. Data collection using self-report 
methods may produce inaccurate and biased information (Barker, Pistrang & Elliott, 
2003). For example, some retrospective studies collected data from periods as great as 
within the past year and are therefore prone to selection and recall bias (Henry, Moffitt, 
Caspi, Langley & Silva, 1994). When steps are taken to provide some validation for 
self-report data, Wiles et al. (2006) caution against the use of untrained clinicians who 
may over report psychotic experiences and who were utilised in a selection of the survey 
data reported herein. Additional concerns regarding sampling include the fact that 
people who self-select for research of this kind may be more prone to psychological 
disturbance (Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith et al., 2005).  Indeed, the data may 
be skewed in the opposite direction because participants may be subject to denial and 
minimize the presence of symptoms due to the stigmatization of such subject matters 
(Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith et al., 2005). Specifically regarding student 
samples, it has been suggested that this population may be prone to overestimating the 
levels of delusional beliefs compared to samples drawn from the general population 
(Lincoln & Keller, 2008) and over reporting atypical and low-frequency symptom-like 
experiences (Merckelback & van de Ven, 2001). Sampling methodologies restricted to 
student populations are also not epidemiologically representative and make 
generalization to the wider nonclinical population difficult (Freeman, Garety, 
Bebbington, Smith et al., 2005). Lastly, the design of cross-sectional surveys do not 
allow for causality to be inferred. Longitudinal surveys go some way to being more able 
to assert causal claims, but no survey methods permit the systematic manipulation of 
moderator or mediator variables to be able to infer causality robustly. A number of 
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experimental paradigms have been developed to investigate nonclinical paranoia which 
overcome some of the criticisms outlined above.  
 
1.7 Investigating Paranoia in the General Population: Experimental Paradigms 
Three experimental paradigms will now be reviewed including laboratory procedures 
which manipulate heightened self-awareness and task feedback (Bodner & Mikulincer, 
1998; Ellett & Chadwick, 2007), virtual reality paradigms (Freeman et al., 2003; 
Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Slater et al., 2005; Freeman, Pugh et al., 2008) and a 
strategic decision game called the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG; Ellett et al., 2013).    
 
1.7.1 Self-Awareness 
A number of experimental studies have used the manipulation of self-awareness in the 
induction of paranoid thoughts in the nonclinical population. In five experiments, 
Bodner and Mikulincer (1998) exposed a sample of Israeli student participants to 
solvable or unsolvable problems with neutral or negative feedback about performance. 
Attentional focus was manipulated by using a mirror and a video camera and monitor, 
which were focused either on participants themselves or on the experimenter as a 
threatening external agent. They found that when attention was focused on the self, 
personal failure produced depressive-like reactions, but when attention was focused on 
an external threatening agent, participants showed paranoid-like responses. The 
findings suggest that paranoia can occur in a nonclinical, albeit student, population 
when personal failure is experienced as the result of an external agent (Bodner & 
Mikulincer, 1998).  
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In a series of studies Ellett and Chadwick (2007) utilised a similar methodology 
with a larger sample of British students. In their initial study, conditions of high self-
awareness produced higher paranoia even when no feedback was given; this is 
suggestive that for individual’s experiencing high levels of self-awareness, even 
ambiguous feedback can result in increased paranoia.  Their second study intimated at 
the persistence of paranoia once activated; they showed that once feelings of paranoia 
were present they did not reduce even when self-focus was reduced. In their final study 
Ellett and Chadwick (2007) incorporated a priming task aimed at boosting or depleting 
current psychological resources available to participants. The positive priming group 
had lower scores on the Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanables, 1992) suggesting that 
paranoia as a response to task feedback under conditions of high self-awareness can be 
moderated by the salience of positive self-cognitions. These experimental 
manipulations show that under conditions of high self-awareness higher paranoia is 
experienced, that this can be moderated by positive thoughts of the self, and that 
paranoia, once activated, is persistent.  
 
1.7.2 Virtual Reality Paradigms 
Freeman and colleagues have published a series of studies using virtual reality 
environments to study paranoia using experimentally manipulated virtual reality 
settings within nonclinical populations. In the largest scale study (N = 200) of a 
representative sample of the local nonclinical adult population, Freeman, Pugh et al. 
(2008) used a London underground (‘tube’) train virtual environment populated with 
computer characters inclusive of an audio recording of typical background noise to 
increase ecological validity. Persecutory delusions were assessed using the Paranoid 
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Thoughts Scale (GTPS; Green et al., 2008). Individuals who reported paranoid thoughts 
in day-to-day life were approximately twice as likely to experience paranoid thoughts 
in the virtual reality setting compared to individuals who reported no paranoid thoughts 
in day-to-day life (Freeman, Pugh et al., 2008). Levels of self-reported paranoid 
thoughts towards the neutral computer characters were high; in excess of 40% of their 
general population sample reported paranoid thoughts. These findings are consistent 
with epidemiological studies detailed previously, as well as replicating smaller-scale 
virtual reality paradigms from Freeman and colleagues using a library scene with 
participants from the general population (Freeman et al., 2003, N = 24; Freeman, 
Garety, Bebbington, Slater et al., 2005, N = 30). Freeman, Pugh et al. (2008) attest to 
the validity of the virtual reality paradigm in nonclinical populations; the authors report 
a significant association between trait levels of paranoia and the occurrence of paranoid 
thinking in virtual reality.  
Virtual reality paradigms have provided a novel experimental method for the 
study of nonclinical paranoia in controlled environments that have afforded some 
advantages over cross-sectional and longitudinal survey methods. Specifically, the 
paradigm provides access to participants’ current attributions for events rather than 
purely retrospective views (Freeman, Pugh et al., 2008). Additionally, it perhaps offers 
more ecological validity than previous experimental methods outlined: preliminary 
evidence suggests that participants do act in ways synonymous to real life when in 
virtual reality (Emmelkamp et al., 2002; Glantz, Rizzo & Graap, 2003) and virtual 
reality is acceptable to participants without causing distress (Valmaggia et al., 2007). It 
also provides fruitful areas for future research including exploration of the causal roles 
of psychological processes in the development and maintenance of nonclinical paranoia 
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which can be established by their manipulation before participants enter virtual reality 
(Freeman, Pugh et al., 2008). Nonetheless, disadvantages are still apparent. The general 
accessibility to research and clinical teams is hampered greatly by the costs and 
technology requirements of virtual reality and indeed, previous laboratory studies that 
have still required access to specialist audio-visual equipment. Also, as pointed out by 
the authors (Freeman, Pugh et al., 2008; Freeman et al., 2010) despite the futuristic 
nature of virtual reality, the paradigms have still been unable to improve upon the use 
of self-report for the assessment of paranoia. Freeman et al. (2010) state in their defence 
“no other markers of the experience are available” (p. 263). The following section will 
detail a third, novel experimental method that seeks to provide such a marker in 
nonclinical populations.  
 
1.7.3 The Prisoners Dilemma Game (PDG) 
The PDG involves two players, who make a simple choice either to cooperate with or 
compete against each other without discussion (Ellett et al., 2013). Each choice to 
cooperate or compete is attached to a unit of reward or outcome. The central dilemma 
faced by the players is that each can maximise outcomes by competing, yet, 
paradoxically, when both players choose to compete, their outcomes are lower than the 
outcomes they can achieve by mutual cooperation.  Ellett et al. (2013) predicted that 
participants experiencing paranoia about their opponent would be more likely to 
compete in the PDG because they appraised their opponent as malevolent, and 
competition provides the best defensive strategy against a malevolent other (Ellett et 
al., 2013).  
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The authors conducted three studies using the PDG with a nonclinical sample. 
Measures included the behavioural choice to compete or cooperate in the PDG, a 
measure of trait paranoia (Paranoia Scale, PS; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) and a 
measure of state paranoia specifically developed for the research (State Paranoia Scale, 
SPS; Ellett et al., 2013). In the first study (n = 175), correlational analysis showed that 
state paranoia was positively associated with the choice to compete in the PDG. This 
provided preliminary evidence that the PDG can be used to study nonclinical paranoia. 
The second study, (n = 111) provided replication of this result, but went further in 
showing that the relationship between state paranoia and competition only held when 
participants believed they were competing against another player, and not against a 
computer. This provides the first empirical evidence that paranoia is inherently 
interpersonal in nature – one can only feel paranoid about another person or group of 
people. In their final study (n = 152), the authors address limitations to the previous two 
studies and seek to clarify two issues; firstly, to elucidate on the motives for 
competition, and secondly, to establish the role of trait paranoia. Motivation to compete 
in the PDG may stem from greed-based motives (competing to maximise outcomes 
based on the prediction the other player will cooperate) or distrust-based motives 
(competing to defend against the other player based on the prediction that they will also 
have competed). The distinction between greed and distrust is significant because only 
distrust-based competition would be expected to be associated with paranoia, through 
the belief that the other person will act in a way to intentionally cause  harm (i.e., to 
compete and be rewarded with maximum outcomes) (Ellett et al., 2013). The authors 
included a measure of PDG choice reasons (Insko, Kirchner, Pinter, Efaw, & 
Wildschut, 2005). They found that both state and trait paranoia were positively 
associated with distrust-based competition but not with greed-based competition. 
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Furthermore, state paranoia meditated the link between trait paranoia and distrust-based 
competition because it predisposed participants to experience state paranoia in the 
interpersonal PDG context (Ellett et al., 2013). 
Across the three studies, all found significant relationships between state 
paranoia and competition in the PDG attesting to the efficacy of using this paradigm 
for the study of nonclinical paranoia. The studies empirically underscored the 
interpersonal nature of paranoia, leading the authors to conclude the concomitant 
necessity of studying paranoia in an interpersonal context for which the PDG is ideally 
suited. Inherent in the PDG paradigm, making it additionally suited to the study of 
paranoia, is that it concerns threat and the perception of another’s intentions towards 
the self (Ellett et al., 2013). Because each player is unaware of the decision of the other 
player, feedback on their performance is ambiguous which has also experimentally 
been shown to cause paranoia in a nonclinical population (Ellett & Chadwick, 2007). 
Similar to the virtual reality paradigm, the computerised nature of the PDG allows for 
a controlled interpersonal context which can be systematically manipulated (Owens, 
Berry & Ellett, 2014). Unlike virtual reality paradigms, the PDG has the inherent 
advantages of being transportable and inexpensive. As Owens et al. (2014) note, this 
makes it superior to other paradigms in terms of ease of administration and perhaps 
allows for relatively high levels of recruitment. Although these initial results would 
benefit from replication across wider samples of a representative population to further 
attest to their reliability and validity, Ellett et al. (2013) present their results as the first 
paradigm for assessing nonclinical paranoia not solely reliant on self-report measures. 
Unlike all previously summarised studies which have had to rely on self-report 
measures of retrospective paranoia, this novel experimental paradigm provides 
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compelling evidence for conceptualizing distrust-based competition in the PDG as a 
real-time behavioural signature for paranoia in the nonclinical population (Ellett et al., 
2013).  
In addition to replication, the authors conclude that there are a number of areas 
of research that can be investigated to further develop this paradigm. Specifically, they 
highlight that future research on paranoia using the PDG might consider a wider range 
of motivations beyond which they considered. Ellett et al. (2013) clearly showed that 
distrust-based PDG competition is associated with nonclinical paranoia. Outstanding 
questions remain in terms of whether further motivations may also play a causal role in 
promoting PDG competition that may also be associated with paranoia. The following 
section considers how the social psychology literature on human values may provide 
examples of such motivations. Our values guide our behaviour, allowing us to make 
reasoned decisions. Could human values act as a guide to the decision regarding 
whether to cooperate or to compete in the PDG? If so, are there certain values that are 
associated with the decision to compete which may also be associated with paranoia? 
There is no research currently available which examines paranoia in the nonclinical 
population and the role that human values may play in guiding behaviour to build upon 
the results of Ellett et al. (2013). A consideration of how human values could provide 
this is presented next, including background information and relevant empirical 






1.8 Values Theory: What are Values? 
Values convey what is important to us in our lives (Calogero, Bardi & Sutton, 2009).  
Values are defined as broad goals that guide people’s perceptions, attitudes, and 
behaviours across contexts, cultures, and time (e.g., Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). 
Value theorists have adopted a view of values “as the criteria people use to select and 
justify actions and to evaluate people (including the self) and events” (Schwartz, 1992, 
p.1). Individuals hold different values with varying degrees of importance. A particular 
value may be very important to one person but unimportant to another (Schwartz, 
2005). There is a large literature discussing the antecedents to the development of any 
individuals’ personal values. The general view is that values develop from multiple 
combinations of sources including socialization, life experiences, personality traits, 
individual needs and culture (e.g., Kluckhohn, 1951; Meglino & Ravlin, 1998; 
Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992).  
Values are viewed as central aspects of the self (e.g., Brewer & Roccas, 2001; 
Rokeach, 1973). Because of this, values are relatively stable and are expected to be less 
amenable to change than attitudes and needs (e.g., Konty & Dunham, 1997), although 
there is now some preliminary evidence of predictable value change having direct 
implications for the possibility of behavioural change (Bardi & Goodwin, 2011). 
Schwartz and Bilsky (1990) defined values as cognitive structures that can be retrieved 
from memory with conscious awareness on demand. Hence, people know what their 
values are and they can be measured directly by asking people to rate their importance 
(Bardi & Goodwin, 2011). More interestingly, values may also operate without 
consciousness (Schwartz, 1996). Bardi & Schwartz (2003) showed that people are 
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motivated to act according to their values without being consciously aware of the 
driving force of these values at the time of action.  
In a review of the nature of values Schwartz (2005) highlights a general 
conception of values held in the values literature that specifies six main features that 
are implicit in the writings of many theorists  (e.g., Allport, 1961; Feather, 1995; 
Inglehart, 1997; Kluckhohn, 1951; Kohn, 1969; Morris, 1956; Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 
& Bilsky, 1990.)  
1. Values are beliefs linked inextricably to affect. When values are activated, an 
individual may become infused with feeling. People for whom one value is 
important may become aroused if this value is threatened, but satisfied when 
their actions are directly pursuing this value.    
 
2. Values refer to desirable goals that motivate action.  
 
3. Values transcend specific actions and situations. Values will remain relevant 
across the different settings an individual spends time in (e.g., work or school), 
across different pastimes they engage in (e.g., in sports, business, or politics) 
and across a wide variety of people with whom they interact (e.g., family, 
friends, or strangers). This feature distinguishes values from narrower concepts 
like norms and attitudes that usually refer to specific actions, objects, or 
situations.   
 
4. Values serve as standards or criteria. Values guide the selection or evaluation 
of actions, policies, people, and events. People decide what is good or bad, 
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justified or illegitimate, worth doing or avoiding, based on possible 
consequences for the values that are important to them. Values enter awareness 
when the actions or judgments one is considering have conflicting implications 
for different values that one holds to be important.   
 
5. Values are ordered by importance relative to one another. A person’s values 
form an ordered system of value priorities that characterize them as individuals. 
This hierarchical feature also distinguishes values from norms and attitudes.  
 
6. The relative importance of multiple values guides action. Any attitude or 
behaviour typically has implications for more than one value. The trade-off 
among relevant, competing values is what guides attitudes and behaviours 
(Schwartz, 1992, 1996). Values contribute to action to the extent that they are 
relevant in the context (hence likely to be activated) and important to the 
individual.   
 
1.8.1 The Theory of Basic Human Values (Schwartz and Colleagues) 
Two decades ago, Schwartz (1992) proposed what has become the most fully 
elaborated, empirically grounded and widely used theory of basic human values 
(Cieciuch et al., 2013).  Schwartz and colleagues’ theory of basic human values has 
been developed and advanced in light of empirical evidence across many iterations 
(e.g., Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, 2005; Schwartz et al., 
2012). Recently, Schwartz et al. (2012) presented their most refined theory, which 
identified a continuum of 19 meaningful, conceptually distinct values. The refinement 
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of the theory does not imply previous theories to be incorrect; merely, as per Karl 
Popper’s scientific method, better theories replace poorer ones because they explain 
existing observations more effectively (Cieciuch et al., 2013). As such, Schwartz et 
al.’s (2012) refined theory of basic human values provides greater universal heuristic 
and predictive power then previous versions. The 19 basic human values and the 
motivational goal each value is driven by is described in Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.2. The 19 basic values in Schwartz et al.’s (2012) values theory, each defined in terms of their higher-order values and motivational 
goal  
Higher order values Basic value Motivational goal 
 






Freedom to cultivate one’s own ideas and abilities 
Freedom to determine one’s own actions 
Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life 






Personal success according to social standards 
Power through exercising control over people 












Security and power through maintaining one’s public image and avoiding humiliation 
Safety in one’s immediate environment 
Safety and stability in the wider society 
Maintaining and preserving cultural, family, or religious traditions 
Compliance with rules, laws, and formal obligations 
Avoidance of upsetting or harming other people 









Being a reliable and trustworthy member of the in-group 
Devotion to the welfare of in-group members 
Commitment to equality, justice, and protection for all people 
Preservation of the natural environment 
Acceptance and understanding of those who are different from oneself 
 
aAs described by Cieciuch, Davidov, Vecchione, Beierlein, and Schwartz (2014) hedonism is located on the border of openness and self-enhancement values, and is 
included here in the model for openness. bFace is located on the border of self-enhancement and conservation values, and it is included here in the model for conservation. 
cHumility is located on the border of conservation and self-transcendence values, and is included here in the model for conservation. 
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1.8.2 The Motivational Continuum  
Classically, the 19 basic values are presented in a circular continuum as can be seen in 
Figure 1.3. This representation models the fact that each value is related to the other 
values in an organised, coherent manner (Schwartz, 1992). The total pattern of conflict 
and compatibility between values gives rise to a circular structure referred to as a 
‘motivational continuum’ (Schwartz, 1992). Competing value types emanate in 
opposing directions from the centre; complementary types are in close proximity going 
around the circle in light of shared motivational orientations for adjacent values (Bilsky 
& Schwartz, 1994). This determines that adjacent values in the circle can be easily 
pursued with the same actions whereas opposite values in the circle are often impossible 
to pursue with the same actions. For example, by following a specific tradition one can 
fulfil both tradition values and conformity values, and yet, by the same action one is 
likely to violate values of stimulation and self-direction (Calogero et al., 2009). As a 
result, most people who tend to endorse a particular value tend to also endorse adjacent 








Figure 1.3. The circular motivational continuum (Schwartz et al., 2012). Taken from 
Cieciuch et al. 2013.  
 
Schwartz (2005) highlights that actions in pursuit of values have practical, 
psychological, and social consequences. Practically, choosing an action that promotes 
one value (e.g., drug taking; based on the value of stimulation) may literally contravene 
or violate a competing value (e.g., following the dictates of one’s religion; based on the 
value of tradition). The person choosing what to do may also sense that such alternative 
actions are psychologically dissonant; indeed, others may impose social sanctions by 
pointing to practical and logical inconsistencies between an action and other values the 
person professes (Schwartz, 2005).  
43 
 
In addition to the categorisation of 19 human values, the structure of Schwartz 
et al.’s (2012) theory also includes higher order classifications with the motivational 
continuum. As can be seen in Figure 1.2, the circular structure of the 19 basic values 
are bounded by another three circular rings. These additional rings allow for further 
empirically driven categorisation of the 19 values into wider concepts and the circle of 
values can be partitioned for scientific convenience in many different ways. Depending 
on the aims of a study, one might distinguish fewer broadly defined values or more 
narrowly defined values (Cieciuch et al., 2014). This structure also has important 
consequences for how values can be understood to have their motivational effect on an 
individual. Schwartz et al. (2012) elucidate that values bounded by the top half of the 
outermost circle express growth and self-expansion and are more likely to motivate 
people when they are free of anxiety. The values bounded by the lower half of the 
outermost circle are directed toward protecting the self against anxiety and threat. The 
values on the right in the next circle have a personal focus; concern with outcomes for 
self. Those on the left have a social focus; concern with outcomes for others or for 
established institutions. The second circle from the centre indicates the boundaries 
between the four higher order values into which values can be grouped. Openness to 
change values emphasize readiness for new ideas, actions, and experiences. They 
contrast with conservation values that emphasize self-restriction, order, and avoiding 
change. Self-enhancement values emphasize pursuing one’s own interests. They 
contrast with self-transcendence values that emphasize transcending one’s own 
interests for the sake of others. The innermost circle displays the 19 values as they are 
subsumed within their higher-order value (one of four; openness to change, self-
enhancement, conservation, self-transcendence), and the broader categorization of each 
value having a societal focus vs. personal focus, and whether pursuit of the value aims 
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to avoid anxiety and fosters growth vs. pursuit of the value is relatively anxiety 
provoking and serves a self-protecting function.  
 
1.8.3 Values Theory and the PDG  
A major goal of research within the values literature has been to relate individual 
differences in value priorities to differences in attitudes, behaviour, and background 
variables (Schwartz, 1996). Indeed, one such behaviour is interpersonal cooperation 
which Schwartz (1996) investigated using an adapted version of the PDG in relation to 
the values held by a sample of nonclinical participants (N = 90). The author also notes 
that games such as the PDG are constructed to tap behaviours that express relatively 
pure behavioural motivations straightforwardly which make them ideal for hypothesis 
testing. The PDG requires an individual to choose between competing and cooperating. 
Such decisions are likely to reflect the motivational goals they expect to attain by their 
actions (i.e., their values) even when individuals do not consider their values explicitly 
(Sagiv, Sverdlik & Schwarz, 2011). For this task of interpersonal cooperation, Schwartz 
(1996) predicted the relevant value dimension was self-enhancement (these individual-
orientated values include power and achievement) versus self-transcendence (these 
collective-orientated values include benevolence and universalism). As predicted, 
Schwartz (1996) found that the value of power was most negatively associated with the 
decision to cooperate with a point-biserial correlation of -.37. Schwartz’s (1992) 
conceptual definition for the motivational goals for valuing power is for social status 
and prestige, and control or dominance over people and material resources.  Therefore, 
power emphasizes competitive advantage; pursuing power values legitimizes seeking 
maximum own gain even at the expense of others (Schwartz, 1996).  As predicted by 
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values theory, benevolence (rpb=.38) and universalism (rpb =.32) were most strongly 
associated with the decision to cooperate due to their location as polar opposites on the 
circular values structure. Consistent with the author’s predictions, low correlations were 
found for values less relevant to the task’s decision to cooperate or compete, including 
self-direction, stimulation, tradition, and security. Therefore, a commitment to values 
that promote cooperation (benevolence), in the absence of conflict with a commitment 
to values the promote self-transcendence (e.g., power), was necessary to elicit a high 
level of cooperation using the PDG paradigm (Schwartz, 1996). Conversely, a 
commitment to values that promote power, in the absence of conflict with a 
commitment to values that promote benevolence was necessary to elicit a high level of 
competition in the PDG.   
 
1.9 Paranoia, Values and the PDG 
Schwartz (1996) showed that the decision to compete on the PDG was motivated by 
the value of power i.e., having control or dominance over people or material resources. 
Ellett et al. (2013) later utilized the PDG paradigm to show that the decision to compete 
was associated with paranoia in the nonclinical population. Empirically then, 
considering these pieces of research in combination, the value of power may be 
expected to be associated with nonclinical paranoia.  
Theoretically however, there is reason to predict that power is not the most 
likely value to be associated with paranoia. When Ellett et al. (2013) looked at the 
motivations that participants used to cooperate or compete on the PDG, they showed 
that only distrust-based PDG competition (and not greed-based competition) was 
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associated with paranoia. This in interesting for two reasons. Firstly, the construct of 
greed and the value of power are more closely linked theoretically than are the construct 
of distrust and value of power. Greed and power are concerned with similar aims, that 
is, to have control and dominance over resources. It therefore seems theoretically less 
likely that distrust-based PDG competition (rather than greed-based competition) and 
the value of power would be associated. Secondly, the construct of distrust is more 
closely linked theoretically to the value of security. Taking a theoretical perspective, 
there is a clear rationale to link paranoia and security values.  Persecutory delusions are 
defined as beliefs that another person is acting in a way to intentionally cause one harm 
(Freeman & Garety, 2000). Paranoia therefore relates to mistrust and suspicion 
(Freeman et al., 2011). Within their cognitive model of persecutory delusions, Freeman 
et al. (2002), conceptualise persecutory delusions as threat beliefs. As with any threat 
belief, the normative response is anxiety and a desire to protect oneself. Within 
Schwartz et al.’s (2012) value theory, the value of security sums this position up well; 
the conceptual definition of security is ‘safety in one’s immediate environment’ 
(security-personal) and ‘safety and stability in the wider society’ (security-personal). 
When paranoid, we are threatened and it is likely we would hold values that are 
underpinned by maintaining safety for oneself (e.g., security) above those that focus in 
that moment on dominance and control (e.g. power). One tentative concept is that the 
extent of paranoia that one feels in any given moment might be associated dynamically 
with one’s value priorities. Perhaps paranoia has a moderating effect on value priorities 
which would help to pick apart the potential empirical and theoretical links with both 
power and security values.     
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As predicted by the motivational continuum of value priorities, people who tend 
to endorse a particular value tend to also endorse values which are adjacent in the circle, 
and tend not to endorse the values which are opposite in the circle (Calogero et al., 
2009). In line with our predictions that nonclinical paranoia will be positively 
associated with the adjacent values of power and security, we also predict it will be 
most negatively associated with the values which lie opposite. Namely, these are the 
values subsumed within the higher-order value of self-transcendence of universalism 
and benevolence. Self-transcendence involves a commitment to actions that 
transcendence one’s own interests and elevates the interests of others (Schwartz et al., 
2012). Self-transcendence values are at clear odds to those of power and security; a 
commitment to power reflects pursuing one’s own interests for material gain, and a 
commitment to security reflects the restriction of oneself for self-protection. 
Benevolence is defined as ‘being a reliable and trustworthy member of the in-group’ 
(benevolence-dependability) and ‘devotion to the welfare of the in-group members’ 
(benevolence-caring). A commitment to benevolence values is unlikely to be of priority 
for those experiencing paranoia. Similarly, the value of universalism as defined by 
holding commitments to equality, justice, and an acceptance and understanding of those 
who are different to oneself, are not likely to be associated positively by those 
experiencing persecutory paranoia. Empirical support to these theoretically driven 
predictions is offered from Schwartz (1996) who found that benevolence and 
universalism were the most negatively associated values to the decision to compete in 
the PDG. He also found that the other values in the motivational continuum had near 
zero correlations to the decision to compete.     
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In summary, empirical and theoretical rationale exist to predict that different 
values will be associated positively and negatively with paranoia and the decision to 
compete on the PDG. When combining the research of Schwartz (1996) and Ellett et 
al. (2013) there exists empirical support to suggest that the value of power will be 
positively associated with paranoia and the decision to compete in the PDG, and that 
the values of benevolence and universalism will be most negatively associated with the 
paranoia and the decision to compete. On theoretical grounds when considering the 
threat based nature of paranoia, the value of security is more likely to be associated 
with paranoia and the decision to compete in the PDG. No other research exists to 
explore nonclinical paranoia and values. In this sense aspects of the current research 
are exploratory as well as having some empirical and theoretical rationale on which to 
make specific, albeit, tentative predictions.  
 
1.10 Aims of the Current Research 
The current research aims to replicate and extend research into nonclinical paranoia and 
values. The aims of this thesis are explored and discussed in 4 sections corresponding 
to the 4 broad research areas within which the individual hypotheses are located.  
 
1.10.1 Research Area 1: Paranoia and Values 
The first aim of the current research was to explore the 19 basic human values in relation 
to a novel area of association (i.e., nonclinical paranoia) to provide evidence for the 
explanatory power of values in relation to behaviour and extend the knowledge base of 
Schwartz et al. (2012)’s refined theory of human values. The aim was to explicate the 
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relationship between paranoia in the nonclinical population and values to ascertain what 
values will be most and least associated with paranoia. One prediction was made: 
Hypothesis 1) The values of power, security, benevolence and universalism will 
be associated with trait paranoia.   
 
1.10.2 Research Area 2: Paranoia and the PDG 
The second aim of the current research was to replicate the finding of Ellett et al. (2013) 
that distrust-based competition on the PDG is a behavioural marker for nonclinical 
paranoia to provide additional empirical support for the use of the PDG in this research 
area. Three predictions were made: 
Hypothesis 2a) Trait and state paranoia will be associated with the behavioural 
choice to compete in the PDG.  
Hypothesis 2b) Trait and state paranoia will be positively associated with 
distrust motives but not greed motives in the PDG. 
Hypothesis 2c) Distrust will mediate the effect of trait paranoia on the 
behavioural choice to compete in the PDG.  
 
1.10.3 Research Area 3: Values and the PDG 
The third aim of the current research was to extend the research of Ellett et al. (2013) 
and broaden our understanding of paranoia in the nonclinical population by looking to 
the literature on human values as potential motivations for competition on the PDG. 
One prediction was made: 
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Hypothesis 3)  The values of power, security, benevolence and universalism will 
be associated with behavioural choice in the PDG. 
 
1.10.4 Research Area 4: Paranoia, Values and the PDG 
The fourth aim was to combine the three areas of research of nonclinical paranoia, the 
PDG and human values theory to establish whether more complex interactions between 
paranoia and values are associated with PDG competition. Two predictions were made: 
Hypothesis 4a) Valuing power and security will predict PDG competition when 
moderated by trait paranoia.  
Hypothesis 4b) Valuing power and security will mediate the effect of trait 














The method section begins by outlining the study design including power calculations, 
a description of the participants who formed the sample and the recruitment strategy 
employed. Details of socio-demographic data collected in the study, the questionnaire 
measures used and the Prisoners Dilemma Game (PDG) procedure are then provided. 
This is followed by an outline of how the data capture program was developed. Next, a 
full detailed procedure is given. Lastly, the ethical considerations of the study are 
discussed along with the steps taken to address these.  
 
2.2 Design 
The current study uses a cross-sectional design. It comprises one dichotomous variable 
of PDG choice (cooperate or compete) and the associations between variables 
measuring paranoia (state and trait), PDG choice reasons and human values.    
 
2.3 Power Analysis 
A priori power analyses were conducted to ascertain the number of participants required 
for the current study.  Ellett et al. (2013) is the sole study to have examined paranoia 
and the PDG. They performed a point-biserial correlation on state paranoia and choice 
on the PDG, yielding a correlation coefficient of .20, indicating a small-medium effect 
size according to Cohen (1992). In addition, within values theory literature relevant to 
the current study, Schwartz et al. (1996) found a negative correlation (.37) between the 
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value of power and participants’ decision to cooperate on the PDG. This is a medium 
effect size (Cohen, 1992). An effect size between small (.10) and medium (.30) at .20 
was chosen for the current study as it minimizes the chance of missing an effect that 
exists (i.e. a Type II error). As devised by Cohen (1992) for an effect size of .20, with 
power set at the conventional level of 0.8 and alpha at 0.05, approximately 195 
participants were needed for a two-tailed test.  
 
2.4 Sample 
The full experimental sample (N = 221) was obtained from a nonclinical population. 
There were no cases with incomplete data. Participants who indicated previous personal 
contact with mental health services (n = 39) were not excluded from the analysis as 
statistical tests indicated no significant differences between the main variables of 
interest and the rest of the sample. Consequently, the current research can be confident 
it is sampling nonclinical paranoia. The sample comprised 129 female participants 
(58%) and 92 male participants (42%) all between the ages of 18 and 65 years old (mean 
age = 23.23; SD = 6.79 years). Further demographic information is provided in Results 
(section 3.3, page 69). 
 
2.5 Recruitment 
The study employed convenience sampling methods (Barker et al., 2003). 
Undergraduate and postgraduate participants from Royal Holloway University were 
recruited to the study via poster advertisements pinned to noticeboards throughout 
campus and via the electronic ‘campus noticeboard’ intranet facility. Students from 
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other British universities were also approached via email. So as not to be constrained 
by a purely student sample, other methods were employed such as Facebook, gumtree 
and a local poster campaign. All methods provided a summary of the study and the web 
address allowing direct access for participation. The study was completed online. 
Participants were only required to have access to an internet enabled computer, and 
could therefore take part anywhere across the country.  
 
2.6 Measures 
2.6.1 Socio-Demographic Information 
Socio-demographics were collected for age, gender, employment, education and 
marital status, number of children, ethnic or cultural group, religion, and previous 
contact with mental health services. A copy of the socio-demographic questions asked 
can be found in Appendix A. 
 
2.6.2 Values: Portrait Values Questionnaire-Revised (PVQ-R; Schwartz et al., 2012) 
This questionnaire assesses a person’s value system. The PVQ-R defines 19 values. 
Each value has three items that portray a person’s goals, aspirations or wishes that point 
implicitly to the importance of that value (Schwartz et al., 2012). The questionnaire has 
57 items in total. For each item, respondents are presented with a statement such as 
‘He/she thinks it is important to be ambitious’ and are asked to indicate how similar the 
person is to themselves on a 6-point Likert scale (1= not like me at all, 6= very much 
like me). The PVQ-R has a male and female version to accommodate this structure. 
Data gathered in 2010 across 10 countries (N = 3,261) supports this model of human 
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values. Confirmatory factor analysis for the model shows acceptable goodness of fit 
indexes for the Standardized Root Mean Residual (SRMR) at .046 and the Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) at .045 (SRMR and RMSEA values of <.05 
are considered to indicate good fit). The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) is .869, just below 
the .90 (or higher) desired value for goodness of fit (Bentler, 1990). However, Schwartz 
et al. (2012) note that even in correctly specified models CFI tends to worsen as the 
number of variables in a model grows large (Kenny & McCoach, 2003). They suggest 
that there may be no real cause for concern if the CFI is lower than expected if the 
RMSEA seems better. The RMSEA of .045 does indicate good fit suggestive of a 
reliable model. Indeed Schwartz et al. (2012) conclude that the analyses provide 
substantial support for the refinement of the theory of basic human values. A copy of 
the PVQ-R can be found in Appendix B. 
 
2.6.3 Trait Paranoia: Paranoia Scale (PS; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) 
The PS is the most widely used dimensional measure of paranoia (Freeman, Garety, 
Bebbington, Smith et al., 2005).  This questionnaire was specifically designed by 
Fenigstein and Vanable to assess self-reported paranoid cognitions in college student 
samples and specifically includes ideas of persecution. The measure consists of 20 
items. For each item participants rate their agreement on a 5-point scale (1= not at all 
applicable to me, 5= extremely applicable to me), yielding a score range from 20 to 
100. Higher scores indicate higher levels of nonclinical paranoia. Fenigstein & Vanable 
(1992) reported an overall alpha of .84 across four different samples of university 
students (N = 581) implying good internal consistency and good test-retest reliability 
after a relatively long re-test period of 6 months (.70). The authors also report good 
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normative data with a mean total score of 42.7 (SD = 10.2) within a range of 20-100. 
They conclude there to be sufficient variation in scores to consider the instrument 
suitable for use in a college population. A copy of the PS can be found in Appendix C.  
 
2.6.4 State Paranoia: State Paranoia Scale (SPS; Ellett et al., 2013)  
This is a four item scale developed by Ellett et al. (2013) to measure a momentary 
experience of paranoia specifically within the context of the PDG. Similar to the State 
Social Paranoia Scale (SSPS; Freeman et al., 2007) all items on the SPS have the two 
elements of feared harm and intention necessary to be assessing clear persecutory 
thinking as defined by Freeman and Garety (2000). Participants are asked to rate how 
they anticipate experiencing the other participant by marking responses on a 7-point 
Likert scale anchored with two opposing statements. One pole of each item clearly 
indicates an explicit perceived intention of harm, a defining characteristic of paranoia 
(Freeman & Garety, 2000). The four items are: “is hostile to me” vs. “is friendly 
towards me”; “wants to please me” vs. “wants to upset me”; “wants to help me” vs. 
“wants to harm me”; and “respects me” vs. “has it in for me”. Higher scores indicate 
greater state paranoia toward their opponent in the PDG at the time of response. The 
possible range of scores is 4-28. Ellett et al. (2013) present pilot study data using an 
undergraduate sample (N = 162). A factor analysis revealed a single factor explaining 
75% of the total variance. All four SPS items loading highly on to this factor (factor 
loadings > 0.6). The SPS shows good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .92). 
In an additional pilot study (N = 286) the authors present a significant positive 
correlation (r = .415, p = .0005) between Fenigstein and Vanable’s (1992) Paranoia 
Scale, a validated measure of trait paranoia (see Methods, section 2.6.3, page 54), thus 
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attesting to the SPS’s good construct validity. A copy of the SPS can be found in 
Appendix D. 
 
2.6.5 Distrust-Based vs. Greed-Based Competition: Closed Reasons Assessment 
(Insko et al., 2005) 
This self-report measure assesses various reasons for choice in the PDG. It is an 11-
item measure with each item presented as a statement indicating a potential concern 
that may have influenced a PDG choice (e.g., “I wanted to maximise my earnings”). 
Each statement is rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1= not at all like me, 7 = very much 
like me). Distrust was specifically measured with the following two statements: “I 
wanted to defend myself against the actions of the other person” and “I did not trust the 
other person”. Greed was measured with the following two different statements: “I 
wanted to earn more than the other person” and “I wanted to maximise the difference 
between both persons in my favour”. Composite measures of distrust and greed are 
ascertained by averaging across the relevant items. The authors reported good internal 
consistency for distrust (Cronbach’s alpha .71) and greed (Cronbach’s alpha .89). A 
copy of the closed reasons assessment can be found in Appendix E.  
 
2.6.6 Behavioural Measure of Paranoia: Prisoners Dilemma Game (PDG) 
The PDG involves two players who make a choice to cooperate with each other or 
compete against each other (Ellett et al., 2013). Within the PDG the best outcome is to 
compete, however if both players choose to compete they receive less than if they had 
both chosen to cooperate. The payoff matrix used in the current study can be seen in 
57 
 
Figure 2.1. The values shown for each player represent the ‘payoff’ each player 
receives depending on their decision (to cooperate or compete) combined with their 
opponent’s decision (to cooperate or compete). For example, if both players choose to 
cooperate they each receive 90 credits. If ‘you’ choose to cooperate but ‘the other 
player’ chooses to compete, ‘you’ would receive 30 credits and ‘the other player’ 
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2.7 The Online Data Capture Programme 
2.7.1 Programme Development  
The study was developed as an online program accessible via a web address (see 
Appendix F for screen shots of the programme). Development of the online programme 
took place over a 10 month period between November 2012 and September 2013. A 
version of this programme already existed having formed part of the doctoral thesis for 
a previous trainee. Some elements were retained for the present study including the PS, 
the SPS and the closed reasons assessment which were already in an easy-to-use online 
format. It also included the PDG which was itself modelled on extensive research (e.g., 
Cohen, Wildschut, & Insko, 2010; Wildschut, Insko, & Gaertner, 2002; Ellett et al., 
2013). The online program was attached to a secure database. At the point when 
participants completed the study and consented to their data being used, the data was 
automatically uploaded to the database. If participants chose to withdraw their data 
from the study, this was recorded in the database. Data from participants who had only 
partially completed the study was not uploaded to the database.  
This version of the online program was used as a framework for the present 
study with the necessary modifications undertaken in close liaison with the support of 
the university’s IT department. Specifically, the first stage of development involved 
designing the PVQ-R male and female questionnaires into online formats 
complimentary to the three questionnaires already present.  The information and debrief 
pages necessary for this study were also added. Further developments included adding 
withdrawal options on every page in the form of a ‘withdraw’ box. This included a 
confirmatory pop-up window to minimise withdrawal errors whilst allowing 
participants their right to withdrawal. Confirmatory pop-up windows were also added 
59 
 
for any missed questions; the pop-up highlighted which questions had been missed 
within a questionnaire when participants clicked the ‘next’ button to progress to the 
next part of the study. This allowed participants to skip questions intentionally if they 
wished to do so whilst preventing unintentionally missed questions which would 
compromise the completeness of the dataset. Lastly, unique participant identifiers were 
assigned automatically to each participant’s data within the secure database. This 
provided a method for uniquely storing participant data and preserving anonymity and 
confidentiality which did not necessitate participants contacting the researcher for an 
identifier beforehand. This method allowed participants the ability to take part in the 
online study immediately from when they had access to the web address.  
 
2.7.2 Programme Testing  
The program was then tested extensively to identify and remedy any remaining bugs 
and to ensure its compatibility with the major internet browsers (e.g., Firefox and 
Google). The program was then piloted with five people from the general population 
who were representative of the target sample. Each pilot participant completed the 
online study and were asked for feedback. Specifically they were asked to comment on 
acceptability of the interface; acceptability of the time to complete; clarity of the PDG 
instructions; and for any technical problems. One minor amendment was made to the 
wording of the question pertaining to previous mental health contact in order that there 
was no ambivalence as to whether this contact was in a personal or professional 
capacity. The question was altered to read; ‘Have you had previous contact with mental 
health services for personal reasons?’ This was an important methodological 
amendment as it provided data to ensure the study was sampling from a nonclinical 
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population. It was also discovered that the study did not work on mobile devices (e.g., 
smart phones or iPads) because javascript (a computer programming language which 
forms an integral part of the online game) is not compatible on the majority of these 
devices. Consequently, all advertising methods were altered to alert participants that 
the study must be completed on laptops or PCs. No further adjustments were made 
following the pilot feedback.  
 
2.8 Procedure 
All participants accessed the study through a web address. There were no restrictions 
on when participants could access the study and it was possible for multiple participants 
to take part at any one time.  At each stage of the study participants were able to click 
a ‘withdraw’ button which would automatically fast-track them to the debrief statement 
at the end of the study and their data would not be uploaded to the secure database.  
Participants first read the information sheet (see Appendix G) and were asked 
to consent to taking part in the study (see Appendix H). Participants checked a box if 
they agreed to the following three questions: 1) I have read and understood the 
information describing the study; 2) I am aged between 18 and 65 years old and freely 
consent to participate; and 3)  I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at 
any time. If they did not respond in the affirmative they were unable to proceed with 
the study. Participants were then presented with a short description of each measure 
and asked to complete them in turn. Firstly participants provided a number of socio-
demographic details, followed by the completion of the PVQ-R and the PS.   
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The next screen presented detailed PDG instructions as used in Ellett et al. 
(2013). Of note, participants were told they would be playing between one and six 
rounds of the PDG. In reality, all participants played only one round. This minor 
deception was utilised as in previous research (e.g., Ellett et al., 2013) to avoid the 
restriction of range seen in research studies as a result of an increase in competition if 
participants know they are only completing a single round (Axelrod, 1984; Pruitt & 
Kimmel, 1977). Specifically, this increase in competition exists because in a one-round 
game, each side maximizes its outcomes by competing regardless of whether the other 
side cooperates or competes (Wildschut, Lodewijkx, & Insko, 2001). Similarly, 
participants were informed they were playing the PDG against another player online. 
In reality they were playing the computer (i.e., the online programme had been pre-
programmed). Participants were informed that the amount of credits they would earn 
would be determined by their own PDG choice as well as the PDG choice of the other 
player. The decision matrix was given (as shown in Figure 2.1) with an explicit step-
by-step description of each possible combination and the amount of credits earned in 
each. On the following page, to ensure full comprehension of the PDG matrix, 
participants were asked to provide the amount of credits won in four matrix scenarios. 
They could only proceed if they provided correct answers (Wildschut et al., 2002). On 
the following screen participants see the words ‘searching for other participant’ flash 
for 30 seconds. Whilst they are ostensibly waiting for another player to be found the 
decision matrix and the four scenarios from the previous screen with the correct credit 
outcomes are provided as a refresher. After the 30 seconds has elapsed ‘we have located 
another player’ appears on the screen. Automatically they are taken to the next screen 
which allows them to make their PDG choice whilst the matrix is provided for the final 
time as an aide-mémoire. The words ‘your selection is being confirmed’ flash on the 
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screen for seven seconds immediately following their PDG choice. It is then replaced 
by the words ‘whilst we are waiting for your opponent’s choice please answer the 
following questions’ and the screen automatically moves to present the SPS with brief 
instructions. The final questionnaire, the measure of choice reasons, is then presented.  
Participants were then informed of their opponents’ choice (which is always 
that they cooperated) and that they had reached the end of the game. The following 
screen provided a full debriefing statement (see Appendix I) highlighting the small 
amounts of minor deception utilised and reiterating the sources of support available 
should participants feel worse for having taken part in the study. Participants were 
asked to consent to their data being used in the study now that a full understanding was 
held, thus allowing them another opportunity to withdraw if they wished to do so. 
Finally, to receive their iTunes voucher for taking part, participants were asked to email 
the experimenter, and were informed that they have earned a 99p iTunes song which 
would be ‘gifted’ to them after they provided two potential song choices.      
 
2.9 Ethical Considerations  
Full ethical approval was obtained from the Royal Holloway Ethics committee prior to 
the commencement of data collection (reference 2013/006). See Appendix J for a copy 
of the approval. The British Psychological Society (BPS) have published a number of 
guidelines that pertain to ethical considerations relevant to this research. These include 
the Code of Human Research Ethics (BPS, 2011) applicable to all research using 
humans and a recent adjunct, Ethics Guidelines for Internet Mediated Research (IMR; 
BPS, 2013) which highlights how special consideration may be needed to certain 
principles in an IMR context. Additionally, Conducting Research on the Internet (BPS, 
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2007) was consulted for the current research in its capacity to provide more general 
guidance for all online psychological research, as well as adhering to the principles 
outlined in the BPS’s Supplementary Guidance on the use of Social Media (BPS, 2012) 
as the current study utilised recruitment through social media as one method of reaching 
potential participants.  
Issues of informed consent, withdrawal, debrief and deception were adhered to 
in this study. More specifically, to ensure that consent was truly as ‘informed’ as 
possible, a tick box option was put in place to confirm that participants had read and 
understood the information. Until this was checked participants were not able to 
progress. The online programme was designed to have the ability for participants to 
intentionally skip questions should they wish to do so whilst reducing unintentionally 
missed questions with the use of confirmatory pop-up windows. The online programme 
also had the functionality to allow participants to withdraw at any point. In terms of 
debrief, the debrief page was fully comprehensive and was provided on completion of 
the study, but also if participants chose to withdraw at any point before the end of the 
study.  Lastly, when considering deception, the study design purposely uses deception 
in that participants will only complete one game of the PDG but are told it may be 
between one and six rounds, and in thinking they were playing a real person. However, 
as discussed previously, this is necessary to ensure the validity of the research. This 
level of deception is minor, and was not anticipated to cause any psychological or 
emotionally negative effects. However, the debrief page signposted participants to their 
local counselling service (for RHUL university students), their GP and the Samaritans.  





3.1 Overview of Chapter 
The results chapter begins with a data analysis section which outlines the main 
statistical methods used for each hypothesis as well as general conventions adhered to 
throughout. This is followed by a data screening section which describes procedures 
undertaken for preparing the data before the relevant statistical analyses were carried 
out. Details are provided regarding the process of examining the normality of 
distributions, including any transformations undertaken for non-normal distributions, 
and the steps taken to deal with missing data, outliers and extreme scores. The socio-
demographic characteristics of the sample are then presented. Finally, each of the four 
research areas with associated hypotheses are outlined and their corresponding 
statistical analyses are reported.  
 
3.2 Data Analysis  
The data for the current study were analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences version 21.0 (SPSS; version 21.0). For data interpretation, exact p-values are 
given, unless otherwise stated. Findings are reported to two decimal places with the 
exception of percentages which are reported to one decimal place, and mediation and 
moderation analysis which are reported to three decimal places. All hypothesis testing 
was two-tailed. Where Levine’s Test for Equality of Variances was found to be 
significant, t-values where equal variances were not assumed were reported.  For 
correlational analyses with multiple comparisons, Bonferroni corrections were applied 
to redress the inflated Type I error (incorrect rejection of a true null hypothesis). 
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To address the hypothesis that forms Research Area 1 concerning the 
relationships between values and paranoia, Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation 
coefficients were calculated for trait paranoia (PS scores) and the 19 basic human values 
(PVQ-R). This hypothesis was part a priori as determined by empirical and theoretical 
considerations provided earlier, and part exploratory because research into associations 
between paranoia and values is novel. For this reason all 19 basic values were used in 
the correlational analysis with the Bonferroni correction.  
                To address the hypotheses that form Research Area 2 concerning paranoia 
and the PDG, a dichotomous variable was created where ‘0’ was coded as cooperation 
on the PDG and ‘1’ was coded at competing on the PDG. The categorical nature of the 
PDG variable meant point-biserial correlation coefficients were calculated to 
investigate the associations between paranoia (trait and state) and PDG choice (compete 
or cooperate), as well as to greed and distrust motives (choice reasons assessment). 
Mediation analysis was used to further investigate distrust-based competition on the 
PDG. The present research utilizes increasingly widespread approaches which reject 
the prerequisite that mediation analysis can only be undertaken if one can successfully 
demonstrate an association between the predictor variable (X) and the outcome variable 
(Y) (e.g., Hayes, 2009; MacKinnon, 2008; Zhao, Lynch & Chen, 2010).  These new 
approaches are now in favour over traditional models of mediation, namely Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) causal steps model. Subsequently, mediation analysis is conducted with 
Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS tool as an adjunct to SPSS. Bias-corrected bootstrap 
confidence intervals (1,000 samples) are used as the inferential approach for the indirect 
effects (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
Bootstrapping is a resampling method that offers an increasingly utilized alternative to 
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normal theory approach which benefits from making no assumptions about the shape 
of the sampling distribution (Hayes, 2013). Bootstrapping generates an empirically 
derived representation of the sampling distribution of the indirect effect by sampling n 
cases from the original sample (N = 221) and resampling observations with replacement 
to produce an estimate of the summary statistic. To address the hypothesis in Research 
Area 3 concerning values and PDG choice, point-biserial correlation coefficients were 
calculated.  
              Lastly, to address the hypotheses in Research Area 4 concerning paranoia, 
values and the PDG, mediation analysis as described previously was used. In addition, 
the presence of statistical interaction effects were investigated using multiple 
regressions to explore the association between values (namely, power and security) and 
PDG choice as potentially varying depending upon paranoia levels. For moderation 
analysis, all paranoia and value scores were centered by subtracting the mean from each 
variable to leave deviation scores before being entered into the regression models 
following Aiken & West (1991) and as recommended in this form of analysis (Hayes, 
2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Regression models were used to identify interaction 
effects, and where significant, Preacher, Curran and Bauer’s (2006) online interaction 
tool was used to further decompose the relationship between predictor and outcome 
variables. For this hypothesis, composites were calculated for power and security by 
averaging the scores across the two power values (dominance and resources) and two 





3.2.1 Data Screening  
Prior to carrying out any statistical analysis, descriptive statistics were explored which 
confirmed that all observed data were within expected ranges. The data set was 
screened for missing data, of which there were no missing values (N = 221). Screening 
for outliers was undertaken next, and a screen to ensure that all the assumptions for the 
use of parametric analyses were met (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  
In accordance with the aim of the study to investigate paranoia in the nonclinical 
population, independent t-tests and a Chi-Square were conducted to ascertain if 
responses to the relevant independent variables differed depending on whether 
participants indicated previous personal contact with mental health services or not. 
There were no differences found between participants who had indicated having 
previous personal contact with mental health services and those who had not for our 
relevant paranoia measures of PDG choice (χ2(1) = .95, p = .329), PS scores (F = 1.55, 
p = .22), or SPS scores (F = .55, p = .46). Therefore, previous contact with mental health 
services was not used as an exclusion criteria. All participant data were retained.  
 
3.2.2 Outliers 
Outliers were investigated by observing the frequency outputs and generating boxplots 
for all measures. An outlier was defined as an extreme score if the data point was more 
than three standard deviations from the mean of the variable of interest (Field, 2009). 
Within the paranoia measures two outliers were identified in the PS and eleven outliers 
were identified in the SPS of which four were extreme scores. Tabachnick & Fidell 
(2001) suggest that for univariate outliers a first option for reducing impact is variable 
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transformation, undertaken to change the shape of the distribution to more nearly 
normal. This methodology was applied when numerical operators indicated significant 
z-scores for skew and kurtosis, as was the case for the PS. Where numerical indicators 
suggest datasets were normally distributed, as with the SPS, extreme scores were 
retained in the dataset. This prevented a loss of power and because the sample is large 
in the present study, the chance that the extreme SPS scores would have a 
disproportionate influence is lowered (Field, 2009; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  
 
3.2.3 Parametric Data Assumptions 
The distributions of the PS, SPS, and for the entire sample (N = 221) were checked for 
normality by inspecting their histograms with normal curves and calculating skewness 
and kurtosis z-scores using the following formulae: 
Z skewness  =       S – 0             Z kurtosis  = √      K – 0  
                           SE skewness                                         SE kurtosis 
 
A distribution was considered normal if a z-score for both skewness and kurtosis was 
less than 2.58 (p < .01) (Field, 2009). The PS was significantly positively skewed (z = 
4.36, p <.01).  A square root transformation was applied (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) 
which resulted in a normal distribution with acceptable levels of skew (z = 2.34, p >.01) 
and kurtosis (z = .70, p >.01). The SPS had acceptable levels of skew (z = -2.53, p >.01) 





3.3 Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Sample 
The socio-demographic characteristics for the entire sample are presented in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1. Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample 
  Total N = 221 
Gender N (%)   
Male 92 (41.6) 
Female 129 (58.4) 
Age in years   
Mean 23.23 
Standard deviation 6.79 
Employment status N (%)   
Employed 36 (16.3) 
Full-time education 176 (79.6) 
Unemployed 9 (4.1) 
Education status N (%)   
O-levels/GCSE or equivalent 46 (20.8) 
A-levels or equivalent  145 (65.6) 
Degree or equivalent 28 (12.7) 
Post-graduate qualification or equivalent  2 (.9) 
Ethnic/cultural group N (%)   
White British 146 (66.1) 
Any other white background 27 (12.2) 
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Asian  33 (14.9) 
Any other black background 1 (.5) 
Mixed white British and other 9 (4.1) 
Mixed white non-British and other 2 (.9) 
Any other mixed background 3 (1.4) 
Religion N (%)   
Christian 74 (33.5) 
Buddhist  1 (.5) 
Hindu 4 (1.8) 
Muslim 11 (5.0) 
Jewish 1 (.5) 
Other  7 (3.2) 
None 122 (55.2) 
Marital status N (%)   
Single 186 (84.2) 
Married or cohabiting 35 (15.8) 
Number of children N (%)   
0 206 (93.2) 
1 8 (3.6) 
2 5 (2.3) 
3 1 (.5) 
4 0(0) 




3.4 Statistical Analyses of the Hypotheses 
3.4.1 Research Area 1: Paranoia and Values 
Pearson’s product-moment correlations were calculated between trait paranoia and the 
19 value priorities of the PVQ-R (see Table 3.2). To protect against family-wise error, 
a Bonferroni corrected alpha level of 0.003 (i.e., 0.05/19) was employed.  
 
Table 3.2. Correlation matrix for trait paranoia (PS scores) and PVQ-R value priorities 
 Trait Paranoia 
Values Pearson’s r p-value 
SDT: Self-direction-thought -0.06 .36 
SDA: Self-direction-action -0.02 .78 
ST: Stimulation 0.04 .52 
HE: Hedonism -0.13 .05 
AC: Achievement 0.11 .11 
POD: Power-dominance 0.14 .04 
POR: Power-resources 0.19 .01 
FAC: Face 0.34 <.001* 
SEP: Security-personal -0.01 .93 
SES: Security-societal 0.02 .77 
TR: Tradition -0.01 .89 
COR: Conformity-rules -0.05 .43 
COI: Conformity-interpersonal -0.00 .97 
HU: Humility -0.13 .06 
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BED: Benevolence-dependability -0.00 .96 
BEC: Benevolence-caring -0.14 .03 
UNC: Universalism-concern -0.12 .09 
UNN: Universalism-nature -0.06 .34 
UNT: Universalism-tolerance -0.23 <.001* 
Note. *p<.003 
 
The observed Pearson’s correlations between trait paranoia and the importance 
attributed to each value type are shown graphically in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3. Pearson’s correlations of value priorities and trait paranoia  











































Hypothesis 1) The values of power, security, benevolence and universalism will be 
associated with trait paranoia.   
A statistically significant correlation was found between trait paranoia and valuing 
face. Correlations were significant for trait paranoia and valuing power-dominance 
and power-resources but these associations did not reach statistical significant after 
the Bonferroni correction was applied. No significant correlation was found between 
trait paranoia and valuing security (personal or societal).  
A statistically significant negative correlation was found between trait 
paranoia and valuing universalism-tolerance. The association between trait paranoia 
and benevolence-caring was significant but did not reach statistical significance after 
the Bonferroni correction was applied. No further significant correlations were found 
between trait paranoia and valuing the additional universalism values (concern and 
nature) nor for the other benevolence value (dependability). Additionally, the 
association between trait paranoia and ‘hedonism’ was significant but did not reach 
statistical significance after the Bonferroni correction was applied.  
These findings indicate that Hypothesis 1 was partially supported. 
 
3.4.2 Research Area 2: Paranoia and the PDG 
Among the total sample, 109 participants chose to cooperate and 112 choose to 
compete on the PDG. Descriptive statistics for trait and state paranoia for the entire 
sample and based on the decision to either compete or cooperate on the PDG are 




Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics for trait and state paranoia for the entire sample and 
by PDG choice  
  Compete Cooperate Total 
  N=112 N=109 N=221 
Paranoia Scale (PS)    
Mean 40.16 39.74 39.96 
Standard deviation 1.18 0.98 1.08 
Range 20-86 20-88 20-88 
State Paranoia Scale (SPS) 
Mean 14.98 14.37 14.68 
Standard deviation 2.97 2.81 2.90 
Range 5-25 6-24 5-25 
 
 
Hypothesis 2a) Trait and state paranoia will be associated with the behavioural 
choice to compete on the PDG.  
Because PDG choice is a dichotomous variable, point-biserial correlations (rpb) were 
calculated. The point-biserial correlation coefficient between competition on the 
PDG with both trait paranoia (rpb (219) = .016, p = .81) and state paranoia (rpb (219) 
= .106, p = .12) was not significant. This finding indicates that Hypothesis 2a was 




Hypothesis 2b) Trait and state paranoia will be positively associated with distrust 
motives but not greed motives on the PDG. 
Descriptive statistics for state paranoia, trait paranoia and scores for total-distrust and 
total-greed are detailed in Table 3.5.   
 
Table 3.5. Descriptive statistics for state paranoia (SPS), trait paranoia (PS), distrust 
and greed total scores  
 Mean SD Range 
State Paranoia Scale (SPS) 14.68 2.90 5 - 25 
Paranoia Scale (PS) 39.00 13.58 20 - 88 
Distrust Score 3.51 1.64 1 – 6 
Greed Score 3.35 1.9 1 - 7 
 
As predicted there was a significant positive relationship between distrust and 
trait paranoia (r(219) = .210, p = .002) and a non-significant relationship for greed 
and trait paranoia (r(219) = .085, p = .210). Higher trait paranoia is associated with 
higher distrust and is not associated with greed. As predicted there was a significant 
positive relationship between distrust and state paranoia (r(219) = .182, p = .007), 
such that higher distrust was associated with higher state paranoia. There was also a 
significant positive relationship between state paranoia and greed (r(219) = .179, p = 
.007) indicating that higher greed is also associated with higher state paranoia. These 




Hypothesis 2c) Distrust will mediate the effect of trait paranoia on the behavioural 
choice to compete on the PDG.  
The INDIRECT procedure for SPSS (Peacher & Hayes, 2008) was used to derive 
total, direct, and indirect effects of trait paranoia on PDG choice through distrust 





Figure 3.6. Simple mediation model for trait paranoia on PDG choice via distrust 
Note. Regression coefficients are superimposed on the statistical diagram 
 
Table 3.7. Mediation model coefficients for trait paranoia on PDG choice via distrust  
                                                       Consequent 
  M (DISTRUST)  Y (PDG DECISION) 
Antecedent   Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p 
X(TRAIT PARANOIA a .333 .105 .002 c’ -.068 .137 .616 
M(DISTRUST)  ___ ___ ___ b .305 .090 <.001 
Constant i1 1.404 .670 .037 i2 -.607 .866 .483 
  R2 = .044   
  F(1,219) = 10.128, p = .002   





b = .305 a = .333 
c’ = -.069 
77 
 
The direct effect of trait paranoia on PDG choice was estimated by regressing 
PDG choice onto trait paranoia to produce path c’ (see Figure 3.6). A binary logistic 
regression was used because PDG choice was dichotomous. The direct effect of trait 
paranoia on PDG choice when distrust is held constant (c’ = -.069) is not statistically 
significant (Z = -.502, p = .616). This non-significant relationship replicates the non-
significant relationship between these variables in Hypothesis 2a using a point-
biserial correlation. The total effects of trait paranoia on PDG choice (c = .031) is not 
statistically significant (Z = .239, p = .811). 
More pertinent to the mediation hypothesis was the estimate of the indirect 
effect of trait paranoia on PDG choice. This is quantified as the product of the 
regression coefficient estimating distrust from trait paranoia (path a in Figure 3.6) 
and the logistic regression coefficient estimating PDG choice from distrust 
controlling for trait paranoia (path b in Figure 3.6). The indirect effect of trait 
paranoia on PDG choice mediated by distrust (ab = .333(.305) = .102) is statistically 
significant (95% bias-corrected bootstrapping confidence interval from .036 to .232).  
The mediation analysis shows that the effect of trait paranoia on PDG choice 
to compete operates indirectly through distrust. Higher trait paranoia translates to a 
higher PDG choice (i.e., towards the decision to compete, where 1=compete and 
0=cooperate) as a result of a tendency for those who are more paranoid to feel more 






3.4.3   Research Area 3: Values and the PDG 
Point-biserial correlations were calculated between PDG choice and the value 
priorities of power, security, benevolence and universalism (see Table 3.8). The value 
of face was also included as it sits between power and security in Schwartz et al.’s 
(2013) basic values theory as a consequence of being defined by aspects of both 
power and security.  To protect against family-wise error, a Bonferroni corrected 
alpha level of 0.005 (i.e., 0.05/10) was employed. 
 
Hypothesis 3) The values of power, security, benevolence and universalism will be 
associated with the behavioural choice on the PDG. 
Significant positive correlations were found for PDG choice and valuing power-
dominance and power-resources, such that, when power is a high value priority for a 
participant they are more likely to compete on the PDG. The relationship between 
PDG choice and valuing face and security (personal and societal) were not 
significant.  No statistically significant correlations were found for PDG choice and 
valuing any of the benevolence or universalism values. The findings suggest that 







Table 3.8. Correlation matrix for PDG choice and PVQ-R value priorities for power, 
security, face, benevolence and universalism.  
 PDG Choice (0 = cooperate, 1 = compete) 
Values Point-biserial coefficient rPB p-value 
POD: Power-dominance 0.19 <.001* 
POR: Power-resources 0.19 <.001* 
FAC: Face 0.01 .92 
SEP: Security-personal 0.01 .89 
SES: Security-societal -0.09 .18 
BED: Benevolence-dependability -0.08 .22 
BEC: Benevolence-caring -0.02 .76 
UNC: Universalism-concern -0.07 .32 
UNN: Universalism-nature -0.00 .96 
UNT: Universalism-tolerance -0.12 .09 
Note. * p < .005 
 
3.4.4 Research Area 4: Paranoia, Values and the PDG 
Hypothesis 4a) Valuing power or security will predict PDG competition when 
moderated by trait paranoia.  
A series of logistic regression analyses were carried out in order to investigate 
whether the association between values (namely, valuing security or power) and PDG 
choice (cooperate or compete) depended on the individual’s level of trait paranoia. 
Logistic regression analysis was used because the PDG choice (the dependent 
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variable) is categorical (i.e., compete or cooperate). Of interest for each regression 
model tested, was whether the interaction effect (value*trait paranoia) was significant 
which would indicate further probing of the interaction using simple slopes analysis 
to visually plot the effects (Hayes, 2013).  
The interaction effects between trait paranoia and valuing power for power-
dominance (b = -.075, SEb = .101, β = .928, p = .461) and power-resources (b = .047, 
SEb = .106, β = 1.049, p = .654) were not significant. Similarly, the interaction effects 
between trait paranoia and valuing security for security-personal (b = .073, SEb = 
.135, β = 1.076, p = .585) and security-societal (b = .106, SEb = .129, β = 1.112, p = 
.409) were not significant. Because of non-significant results for the values that 
create the composites of power and security, logistic regression models were not 
tested for composite scores. No interactions were significant so no further exploration 
of the data was warranted. These findings suggest that Hypothesis 4a was not 
supported.  
 
Hypothesis 4b) Valuing power and security will mediate the effect of trait paranoia 
on PDG choice.  
The INDIRECT procedure for SPSS (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) was used to explore 
a simple mediation model for the total, direct and indirect effects of trait paranoia on 
PDG choice through valuing security. The direct effect of trait paranoia on PDG 
choice when security was held constant (c’ = .037) is not statistically significant (Z 
= .285, p = .776). The total effects of trait paranoia on PDG choice (c = .031) is not 
statistically significant (Z = .239, p = .811). Similarly, the indirect effect of trait 
paranoia as mediated through security (ab = .138(-.048) = .007) was also not 
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significant (95% bias-corrected bootstrapping confidence interval from -.064 to .041) 
as the indirect effect straddles zero. 
The INDIRECT procedure for SPSS (Peacher & Hayes, 2008) was used to 
derive total, direct, and indirect effects of trait paranoia on PDG choice through 
valuing power using the model in Figure 3.9. Coefficients for the model can be seen 





Figure 3.9. Simple mediation model for trait paranoia on PDG choice via power 
Note. Regression coefficients are superimposed on the statistical diagram 
 
The direct effect of trait paranoia on PDG choice was estimated by regressing 
PDG choice onto trait paranoia to produce path c’ (see Figure 3.9). A binary logistic 
regression was used because PDG choice was dichotomous. The direct effect of trait 
paranoia on PDG choice when power is held constant (c’ = -.069) is not statistically 
significant (Z = -.502, p = .616). The total effects of trait paranoia on PDG choice (c 
= .0311) is not statistically significant (Z = .239, p = .811). 
More pertinent to the mediation hypothesis was the estimate of the indirect 
effect of trait paranoia on PDG choice. This is quantified as the product of the 





b = .486 a = .304 
c’ = -.069 
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the logistic regression coefficient estimating PDG choice from power controlling for 
trait paranoia (path b in Figure 3.9). The indirect effect of trait paranoia on PDG 
choice mediated by power (ab = .304(.486) = .148) is statistically significant (95% 
bias-corrected bootstrapping confidence interval from .064 to .288). 
The mediation analysis shows that the effect of trait paranoia on PDG choice 
to compete operates indirectly through power. Higher trait paranoia translates to a 
higher PDG choice (i.e., towards the decision to compete, where 1=compete and 
0=cooperate) as a result of a tendency for those who are more paranoid to value 
power more highly. The findings suggest that Hypothesis 4b was partially supported. 
 
Table 3.10. Mediation model coefficients for trait paranoia on PDG choice via power 
Consequent 
  M (POWER)  Y (PDG DECISION) 
Antecedent   Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p 
X(TRAIT PARANOIA) a .304 .063 <.001 c’ -.114 .141 .420 
M(POWER)  ___ ___ ___ b .486 .149 .001 
Constant i1 .925 .406 .024 i2 -.170 .833 .839 
                 R2 = .095   
  F(1,219) = 22.903, p <.001   









 The aims of the study were: (1) to examine relationships between paranoia in the 
nonclinical population and human values; (2) to replicate the finding of Ellett et al. 
(2013) that distrust-based competition on the PDG is a behavioural marker for 
nonclinical paranoia; (3) to extend the research of Ellett et al. (2013) by looking to the 
social psychology literature on human values as additional potential motivations for 
competition in the PDG; and (4) to combine the three areas of nonclinical paranoia, 
human values and the PDG together to further explore any potential complex 
interactions.  
This chapter will begin by discussing the study’s main findings separated into 
four sections based upon the key findings. These sections are: (1) paranoia and values; 
(2) paranoia and the PDG; (3) values and the PDG and (4) paranoia, values and the 
PDG combined. The findings are discussed in relation to relevant existing theory and 
empirical research, and incorporate suggestions for future research. Potential clinical 
implications of the research will then be outlined, followed by a discussion of the 
study’s strengths and limitations, and finishing with concluding remarks. 
 
4.2 Main Findings  
4.2.1 Paranoia and Values 
No previous research has directly examined associations between nonclinical paranoia 
and human values despite the conceptual overlap between the role of values in forming 
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attitudes and beliefs to guide behaviour, and the role of beliefs about the self, world and 
others as central components in the formation of persecutory delusions across the 
paranoia continuum (Freeman & Freeman, 2008; Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith 
et al., 2005; Freeman et al., 2002). 
Notwithstanding this lack of research, there are empirical and theoretical 
grounds for expecting specific values to be associated with paranoia. For example, 
when considering the research of Schwartz (1996) and Ellett et al. (2013) there exists 
empirical support to suggest that the value of power will be associated with paranoia. 
On theoretical grounds when considering the threat based nature of paranoia (Freeman, 
et al., 2002; Freeman & Garety, 2000; Freeman, 2007; Freeman & Freeman, 2008) the 
value of security is hypothesized to be more likely to be associated with paranoia.  
Interestingly, higher trait paranoia was not directly associated with the values 
of security (personal or societal) nor power (resources or dominance) individually, but 
rather with face, a novel value in Schwartz et al’s (2012) refined human values theory 
which expresses elements of both power and security.  Individuals who value face, 
value maintaining and protecting their prestige. Exploiting one’s prestige enables 
people to control others and command resources. It also enables one to defend against 
the threats to one’s security inherent in attacks on one’s public image which allows us 
to avoid humiliation (Schwartz et al., 2012). Interestingly then, higher trait paranoia is 
associated with both power and security values as was predicted, but this association 
was through the combination of security and power values as subsumed in valuing face, 
rather than a direct association to each value per se.  
The association between higher trait paranoia and a commitment to maintaining 
one’s public image is consistent with research in the nonclinical population that 
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suggests that conditions of high self-awareness are associated with higher trait paranoia 
in experimental settings (Ellett & Chadwick, 2007). The motivational goals of 
protecting one’s image and defending against humiliation as subsumed by a 
commitment to the value of face also have overlap with clinical models of persecutory 
delusions. Bentall and colleagues (Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994; Bentall et al., 
2001) suggest that persecutory delusions are formed as a result of ineffective efforts to 
minimise the threat to self-esteem from discrepancies between how one would ideally 
like to be perceived versus how they actually perceive themselves. In light of the value 
placed on nonclinical paranoia to inform our understanding of clinical paranoia (e.g., 
Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith et al., 2005) this conceptual overlap between the 
value of face in nonclinical paranoia and the role of self-esteem as a defence against 
clinical paranoia is offered as an interesting finding. It is however, also offered 
tentatively, due to a lack of current clarity in the literature regarding the exact nature of 
the association between clinical and nonclinical manifestations of paranoia (e.g., 
Bebbington et al., 2013).  
 In light of the circular structure inherent in values theory we predicted that 
values in opposition to power and security, namely benevolence and universalism, 
would be most negatively associated with trait paranoia. Consistent with prediction, the 
current research found a strong negative association between valuing universalism-
tolerance and lower trait paranoia. This suggests that individuals who value 
universalism-tolerance (i.e., they have an acceptance and understanding of those who 
are different from oneself; Schwartz et al., 2012) report lower trait paranoia. This fits 
with current conceptualisations of paranoia.  Paranoia relates to mistrust and suspicion 
(Freeman et al., 2011) and is interpersonal in nature (Ellett et al., 2013). Theoretical 
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accounts of persecutory delusions assert a role for assuming the other to be threatening 
and hostile (Freeman et al., 2002; Freeman & Garety, 2003; Freeman, Garety, 
Bebbington, Smith et al., 2005; Green & Philips, 2004; Turkat, Keane & Thompson-
Pope, 1990). Indeed, within a nonclinical sample of college students, Combs, Penn, 
Wicher, & Waldheter (2007) demonstrated that a greater hostility bias in ambiguous 
situations is significantly associated with higher trait paranoia.  Therefore,  if paranoia 
is low, there would be no perception of the ‘other’ as having any form of threat toward 
the self, thus when threat is low, we are able to be more accepting and tolerant of others, 
consistent with the present finding of low paranoia being associated with valuing 
universalism-tolerance.    
Consistent with prediction the present study also found a significant correlation 
with valuing benevolence and lower trait paranoia at a 95% confidence level (p = .03). 
However, the application of a Bonferroni correction to protect against family-wise error 
rate due to multiple comparisons took this coefficient outside of significance (p = .003). 
There is a movement in the literature (e.g., Perneger, 1998) which cautions against the 
use of Bonferroni corrections because the interpretation of a finding depends on the 
number of other tests performed. Perneger (1998) also warns that the adjustment 
increases the likelihood of Type II errors such that truly important differences are 
deemed non-significant. The present study offers this tentatively as one explanation for 
why no statistically significant result of valuing benevolence and lower trait paranoia 
was found.   
The pattern of association between the 19 values provides further support for 
the circular structure of Schwartz et al.’s (2012) value theory. In addition, it has done 
so in relation to nonclinical paranoia, not previously investigated together within the 
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literature before. The motivational continuum of values predicts that any phenomenon 
will be associated with each value in a determined way with associations becoming 
weaker as you move around the values circular structure (see Introduction, section 
1.8.2, page 41). Using correlational analysis, typically one value will be most strongly 
correlated to any phenomenon. This is then followed in strength of association by 
values adjacent to it on the circular structure, and most negatively associated to values 
directly opposed to it on the circular structure. Values orthogonal (at right angles) to 
the most strongly associated value are not predicted to be associated and will have near 
zero-order correlations. Unfolding the values structure for the association with trait 
paranoia yields this integrated prediction of values and paranoia correlations. 
Graphically this pattern of association reveals the predicted sinusoidal ‘wave’ shape in 
the current study (see Results, Section 3.4.1, page 71), as seen in previous studies using 
Schwartz’s value theory (e.g., Schwartz, 1996). In the present study, the value of face 
was most associated with higher paranoia and valuing universalism-tolerance most 
associated with lower trait paranoia with the additional 17 values forming a relatively 
smooth sinusoidal shape between these anchoring values.  
Future research could look to explore the relationship between values and 
paranoia further by investigating the values held by people with clinical persecutory 
delusions. Do the associations between valuing face and universalism-tolerance hold 
for clinical paranoia? Additionally, the associations between values and paranoia could 
be explored with dimensional measures of paranoia such as Paranoia Checklist (PC; 
Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith et al., 2005) which measures frequency, degree of 
conviction and level of distress, or the Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GPTS; 
Green et al., 2008) which assesses the dimensions of preoccupation, conviction and 
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distress. The GPTS can be used in clinical and nonclinical groups (e.g., Green et al., 
2008) thereby allowing a measurement of change in how the dimensions of paranoia 
might be differentially associated with values, but also how these associations might 
change as one moves through the continuum from nonclinical to clinical paranoia. It 
might also be interesting to examine whether individual value priorities differ according 
to whether an individual’s persecutory belief is classified as Poor Me paranoia (i.e. 
harm is undeserved), or Bad Me paranoia (i.e. harm is deserved) (Trower & Chadwick, 
1995). 
 In summary, the present study sought to integrate a body of knowledge on 
human values which exists within social psychology with clinically driven perspectives 
on paranoia. It suggests that nonclinical paranoia is associated with face values and 
least associated with universalism-tolerance. These initial findings would benefit from 
replication to attest to their reliability and validity. Future research may look to establish 
the relationships between values and paranoia across time in longitudinal research to 
improve upon the ability to make causal statements from cross-sectional research. The 
overlap in constructs between values and self-esteem also tentatively suggest the 
potential role that values may have in clinical samples.   
 
4.2.2 Paranoia and the PDG 
The hypotheses relating to paranoia and the PDG were derived from the research of 
Ellett et al. (2013) who argued that distrust-based competition in the PDG is a 
behavioural marker of nonclinical paranoia. The present study sought to establish if this 
finding could be replicated to further support its use as a novel behavioural adjunct to 
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self-report measures. Initial analysis sought to establish an association between PDG 
choice (cooperate vs. compete) and paranoia (trait and state). No significant association 
was found between state or trait paranoia and behavioural choice on the PDG.  It is 
important to consider possible explanations for this null finding, particularly as the 
present study employed a large sample with good power to detect an effect (i.e., 
avoiding a Type II error). Two possibilities are considered. 
The first possible explanation relates to the null association between state 
paranoia and PDG choice by considering the distribution of scores on the SPS. The 
present study found comparable SPS means and standard deviations for PDG 
cooperation and competition to that of Ellett et al. (2013). However, modal data for the 
present study indicated that 51% (n = 112) of the entire sample choose the median 
option which equates to a noncommittal ‘unsure’ response. The SPS did have 
acceptable levels of skew (z = -2.53, p >.01) and kurtosis (z = 2.44, p >.01) but were at 
the ceiling for this definition (acceptable skew and kurtosis when z scores are < 2.58 at 
p < .01; Field, 2009). Data showed a tendency to skew to the lower end of the 
distribution. Indeed, the cumulative percentage of respondents who answered 16 and 
below was 91%, with only 8% of the participants reporting the higher scores of 17-20. 
This may have limited the variation in responses, which is turn limits the availability of 
finding an effect. In light of the null results for state paranoia and PDG competition, 
future research could helpfully explore this further by manipulating the likelihood of 
participants experiencing state paranoia in the PDG paradigm. The camera paradigm 
used by Ellett and Chadwick (2007) could be employed to study how changes in state 
paranoia impact on distrust-based PDG competition. 
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The second explanation relates to the null association between trait paranoia and 
PDG choice. Although this result is surprising, the actual core of the PDG as a 
behavioural marker for nonclinical paranoia relates to the motives with which 
participants compete (i.e., distrust-based competition), not solely just that participants 
compete.  Distrust is a central component of paranoia (Ellett et al., 2013). In the PDG, 
Ellett et al. (2013) reason that competition is used as a defence against the view that the 
opponent possesses malevolent intentions. In line with this, and replicating what Ellett 
et al. (2013) found, the present research found that higher distrust was associated with 
higher state and trait paranoia. A secondary component to the hypothesis was that 
paranoia would not be associated with greed based competition because this relates to 
desires to exploit the other for material gain, and is therefore not conceptually related 
to paranoia. In support of this, no association was found between trait paranoia and 
greed. There was however a significant relationship between state paranoia and greed 
which was not predicted. As discussed previously this effect may be a consequence of 
the distribution of SPS scores. Replication of these findings with a greater spread (and 
therefore greater variation) of scores for state paranoia within the PDG using the SPS 
would be helpful to clarify if the result was valid or can be explained by idiosyncratic 
data.    
The mediation analysis provides additional support for the role of distrust-based 
competition in the PDG. The analysis showed that the effect of trait paranoia on PDG 
competition operates indirectly through distrust. No direct effect was found for trait 
paranoia and PDG choice. This null association was previously reported in Hypothesis 
2a. An important statistical point to address here is the progression to mediation when 
the direct effect is not significant. Contrary to traditional mediation methodologies 
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(e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986), more modern mediation analysis no longer imposes 
evidence of simple association between X (trait paranoia) and Y (PDG choice) as a 
precondition for mediation (e.g., Hayes, 2009; Hayes, 2013; Hayes & Preacher, 2013; 
MacKinnon, 2008). Consequently the mediation is valid, and the results showed a 
significant indirect effect of trait paranoia on PDG choice via distrust. Specifically, 
higher trait paranoia translates to a higher PDG choice (i.e., towards the decision to 
compete, where 1=compete and 0=cooperate) as a result of a tendency for those who 
are more paranoid to feel more distrust. The findings offer support for the use of 
distrust-based competition on the PDG as a marker for nonclinical paranoia, and 
demonstrates the importance of a fuller understanding of the construct of distrust and 
how it relates to paranoia.  
The construct of distrust is intrinsic within the PDG and levels of trust have 
been shown to influence game choice (Insko et al., 2005; Parks & Hubert, 1995; Unoka, 
Seres, Aspan, Bodi & Keri, 2009).  More broadly in the social psychology literature, 
the importance of distrust as a social mechanism for dealing with risk has been 
highlighted (McKnight & Chervany, 2001). As already espoused by Ellett et al. (2013) 
there is a lack of research investigating the relationship between distrust and nonclinical 
paranoia more broadly. This is compounded by a general difficulty in defining trust and 
distrust in the wider literature (McKnight & Chervany, 2001). Ellett et al. (2013) 
propose that conceptually paranoia could be viewed as one specific subset of the wider 
concept of distrust. This would allow for the fact that while paranoia by definition 
contains an element of distrust of another’s motives, it is possible that distrust can exist 
without paranoia (e.g., one may consider another to be untrustworthy without assuming 
malevolence) (Ellett et al., 2013). Within social psychology distrust is viewed as a 
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highly complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). 
McKnight and Chervany (2001) have proposed a multi-dimensional account of distrust 
which they commend for use across different areas of psychological research. Fruitful 
further research could beneficially explore distrust and paranoia to help elucidate their 
relationship. Multi-dimensional models such as that proposed by McKnight & 
Chervany (2001) may be helpful in pulling apart how these two constructs operate 
together. In light of the multi-dimensional nature of both distrust and nonclinical 
paranoia, this is likely to be complex and may require a series of investigations using 
questionnaire and experimental methodologies to triangulate research findings.   
Future research could investigate the role of distrust-based competition across 
multiple PDG iterations to establish if there were changes in distrust-based competition 
over time. Multiple iterations of the PDG requires ‘long-range’ thinking (Pruitt & 
Kimmel, 1977) which is different to that when played in a single trial game. State 
paranoia is likely to increase across time as research suggests that people who compete 
on the PDG often misinterpret defensive reactions to their own behaviour as evidence 
that the other also has competitive intentions (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). This results 
in a self-fulfilling prophecy, which often underlies persistent mutual competition (Pruitt 
& Kimmel, 1977). In this respect we might expect to find an increase level of 
competition and equally higher levels of distrust. It would be interesting to explore how 
this then alters state paranoia and its implications for trait paranoia in regard to the use 
of the PDG in measuring nonclinical paranoia across time.  
Other areas that may be profitable to explore in relation to the PDG and paranoia 
is to establish if distrust-based competition on the PDG can be a marker for nonclinical 
paranoia in other settings. Interestingly, paranoia in clinical samples is commonly about 
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more than one person (Green et al., 2006).  To this end, future research could look to 
investigate paranoia using the PDG when the opponent is a group acting collectively, 
rather than an individual. Experiments with a version of the PDG have revealed that 
groups, as compared with individuals, more frequently selected the competitive choice 
(e.g., Wildschut et al., 2002). The authors hypothesise differing explanations for this 
behaviour including the idea that group members can provide each other with social 
support to pursue their self-interest in a competitive way or that the anonymity provided 
by the group context allowed group members to avoid responsibility for competitive 
behaviour. We might then predict that people acting collectively in group-based PDG 
paradigms would compete more, but would this be through distrust-based competition? 
The role of social support and de-individualisation effects (Festinger, Pepitone & 
Newcombe, 1952; Zimbardo, 1969) from decreased self-evaluation and decreased 
evaluation anticipation may leave participants less aware of the potential threat of the 
opponent (which would indicate distrust-based motives for competition) and compete 
for greed-based motives instead. In turn this may affect the role of distrust-based 
competition as a marker for nonclinical paranoia; would this marker still hold in a group 
setting? What would the effects of playing a group-PDG be on state paranoia and its 
consequent association with trait paranoia?  Additional research would be needed to 
answer these interesting questions definitely.  
In summary, the present study has provided additional support for distrust-based 
competition in the PDG as a behavioural marker for nonclinical paranoia. Although it 
is important that this aspect of the study receives replication due to its relative infancy 
as a developing paradigm, the present study offers its findings in association with those 
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of Ellett et al. (2013) for the use of this simple online game as a measure of nonclinical 
paranoia in addition to traditional self-report measures. 
 
4.2.3 Values and the PDG 
Ellett et al. (2013) concluded their experimental paper with a number of suggestions for 
future research including the investigation of a wider range of motivations for PDG 
choice beyond that which they considered (namely distrust vs. greed motives). The third 
set of hypotheses in the present study looked to the human values literature for such 
additional motivations due to the fact that values serve as standards or criteria, and 
provide justification for choices and behaviours that individuals make (Bilsky & 
Schwartz, 1994). The aims of this third research area were therefore to extend the 
findings from Ellett et al. (2013) to broaden our understanding of how paranoia in the 
nonclinical population can be measured using the PDG.   
Schwartz (1996) had previously found that the value of power was most 
strongly associated with the decision to compete on the PDG in his research into 
interpersonal cooperation. In contrast, he found that benevolence and universalism 
values were most strongly associated with the decision to cooperate on the PDG. The 
current study replicated this finding by reporting significant positive correlations 
between PDG competition and valuing power-dominance and power-resources. 
Contrastingly, no significant associations were found between the decision to cooperate 
and the predicted values of benevolence and universalism. In light of the role that 
distrust plays in PDG competition as a marker for paranoia (Ellett et al., 2013) and the 
theoretical rationale that links distrust to valuing security, it was also predicted that 
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security values would be associated with PDG competition. This was not found in the 
current study. The relationships between PDG choice and security (personal and 
societal) were not significant, nor was there a significant association between PDG 
choice and valuing face (a combination of power and security values).  
The present research highlights the important association of valuing power and 
the decision to compete on the PDG as initially reported by Schwartz (1996). 
Individuals who value power, value exercising control over people and via control of 
material and social resources. In this respect competing on the PDG represents a 
behavioural display of their power values by exerting control over their opponent and 
subsequently controlling the available material resources (i.e., credits in the PDG 
‘payout’ matrix). Ellett et al. (2013) argued that when individuals competed on the PDG 
because of perceived threat from a presumed malevolent opponent, they competed due 
to distrust, and this was associated with nonclinical paranoia. Findings already outlined 
from the current study (see Results, section 3.4.1, page 71) have shown that nonclinical 
paranoia is most associated with valuing face and least associated with valuing 
universalism-tolerance. These associations were not found for PDG choice as may be 
expected when PDG choice is associated with nonclinical paranoia. The most apparent 
explanation for this is that the current hypotheses for which values would be most 
associated with PDG choice did not include the role of motives and so is unable to more 
directly look at which values would be associated with distrust-based competition. The 
current findings lend themselves to hypothesizing that the values which are important 
to individuals who compete with distrust-based motives on the PDG may more directly 
map on to those associated with nonclinical paranoia (i.e., face and universalism-
tolerance). Additional research would be necessary to empirical test this hypothesis.  
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4.2.4 Paranoia, Values and the PDG 
The fourth aim was to combine the three areas of research on nonclinical 
paranoia, the PDG and human values theory to test whether more complex interactions 
between paranoia and values are associated with PDG competition. Two main types of 
analyses were undertaken: (1) moderation analysis to test whether trait paranoia 
moderates the relationship between values and PDG competition, and (2) mediation 
analysis to test whether values mediate the effect of trait paranoia and PDG 
competition.   
The results showed that the relationship between power and security, and PDG 
choice was not moderated by trait paranoia. One potential explanation for this is 
considered within the context of the distribution of PS scores. No individuals reported 
a PS score in the top 10% of the questionnaires’ possible range; the range for the current 
study was 20-88 out of a possible top score of 100. Following a square root 
transformation the PS did have acceptable levels of skew (z = 2.34, p >.01) but was at 
the ceiling for this definition (acceptable skew when z scores are < 2.58 at p < .01; 
Field, 2009) hence the distribution of PS scores were grouped in the lower end of the 
distribution, which may have reduced the variability of scores. Replication of the 
current study could look to increase the spread of scores on the PS such that the 
relationship between PDG choice and values for mild and more severe forms of 
nonclinical paranoia could be investigated differentially. A second consideration for the 
lack of moderating effects for trait paranoia on the relationship between values and 
PDG choice, concerns the fact that this relationship is actually better understood in 
terms of mediation and not moderation. The mediation analyses will now be discussed.   
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The mediation analyses showed that the effect of trait paranoia on PDG choice 
to compete operates indirectly through power. Higher trait paranoia translates to a 
higher PDG choice (i.e., towards the decision to compete, where 1=compete and 
0=cooperate) as a result of a tendency for those who are more paranoid to value power 
more highly. This finding provides further evidence of the important role of power 
within nonclinical paranoia. In student samples, nonclinical paranoia has been shown 
to be associated with feelings of powerlessness (e.g., Ellett et al., 2003; Freeman, 
Garety, Bebbington, Smith et al., 2005). Recently Allen-Crooks and Ellett (2014) used 
Thematic Analysis to qualitatively investigate the phenomenology of why some 
individuals showing clear paranoid ideation do not go on to develop clinical paranoia. 
They showed that nonclinical paranoia reduces naturally over time.  Seven major 
themes were identified in participants’ explanations for changes in response to a single 
paranoid experience. In particular, one theme related to the change in the relationship 
with the persecutor such that individuals reported a reduction in their paranoid 
experience when the power dynamic between themselves and their persecutor was 
reduced. The findings of Allen-Crooks and Ellett (2014) highlight that the role of power 
in nonclinical paranoia is especially relevant within the interpersonal context of the 
power dynamic between the self and persecutor. It would be interesting to research 
whether manipulating a person’s beliefs about the power dynamic between themselves 
and the other within the PDG would alter the relationship between trait paranoia, 
valuing power and PDG competition as presented within this hypothesis.   
The current findings also supports recent research within severe persecutory 
delusions, which shows that power is important within clinical populations as well as 
nonclinical populations. Individuals with current persecutory delusions judge their 
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persecutors as more malevolent and powerful than themselves (Pagat & Ellett, 2014; 
Green et al., 2006). The greater the differential of power between self and persecutor 
was also reflected in levels of emotional wellbeing, such that individuals who felt more 
powerful in the face of their persecutors had lower scores on measures of depression 
and higher scores on measures of self-esteem (Green et al., 2006). Perceived power of 
the persecutor has also been established in the voices literature, highlighting that beliefs 
about the power of voices (omnipotence) are associated with distress and disturbance 
(Birchwood & Chadwick, 1997; Birchwood, Meaden, Trower, Gilbert & Plaistow, 
2000). Collectively, these findings point towards important clinical implications in 
terms of the focus on interventions being to increase a person’s sense of personal 
control and autonomy. These approaches have received empirical support in the voices 
literature such that a central component of CBT for psychosis is to change the 
individual’s relationship with the voice (Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994; Chadwick, 
Birchwood & Trower, 1996; Chadwick, Sambrooke, Rasch, & Davies, 2000). With due 
regard to the fact that the present research utilized a nonclinical sample, the present 
findings may offer very tentative additional support to suggest that similar interventions 
aimed at increasing personal control and autonomy may have a beneficial role in 
reducing the distress of delusions (e.g., Pagat & Ellett, 2014). This focus on improving 
a sense of power through improving one’s sense of self is in keeping with a growing 
body of research that links high levels of paranoid thoughts in nonclinical samples with 
low levels of self-esteem (Combs & Penn, 2004; Ellett et al., 2003; Martin & Penn, 
2001).  
It may be that these areas of research could be fruitfully combined to more fully 
understand the role of power and how it relates to one’s sense of self in relation to 
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others. To this end, future research could look to experimentally manipulate power and 
explore the effect this has on paranoia, and also on PDG choice. Values which are most 
important to a person are more accessible (Bardi, 2000) and values affect behaviour 
only if they are activated (Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Schwartz’s values have been 
shown to be amenable to activation through priming, which had a direct effect on 
predictable behaviour (e.g., Maio, Pakizeh, Cheung & Rees, 2009; Verplanken & 
Holland, 2002). Maio et al. (2009) used three priming manipulations to activate 
participants’ values including a memory based sorting task, a scrambled words task and 
a written task where participants had to read a statement about the values of a fictitious 
person and describe how their own values were similar and different.  
The present study did not find a mediating effect for the role of security in trait 
paranoia and PDG competition, despite the importance of the value of face (which 
involve power and security motivational goals) and nonclinical paranoia. Values relate 
to an individuals’ commitment to one value in the absence of other competing values 
(Schwartz, 1992). The present study was conducted in the UK where it could be 
possible that compared to other cultures the necessity of valuing security is not present 
in the relative threat-free cultural climate of the UK. The relevance of the wider culture 
to have an impact on the accessible values of a population has been shown in a study 
by Schwartz (2001) who reported a far higher endorsement for security values than 
expected in a sample of Jewish students due to a co-occurring security crisis in Israel. 
Cross cultural research would be helpful to ascertain if the relationship between security 
values and paranoia, and the relationship between security values and PDG 
competition, differs as a result of the cultural climate and its impact on the accessibility 
of an individuals’ value priorities. These relationships might also be experimentally 
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investigated by manipulating the level of interpersonal threat that an individual feels 
when playing the PDG by increasing their salience. For example, the player may be 
provided with information on their opponent, or be made to believe that they can hear 
their opponent, or see them, or perhaps even meet their opponent. Specific 
manipulations may be necessary to directly suggest the threat from their opponent as 
there is research to suggest that greater knowledge of the opponent in PDG paradigms 
produces somewhat more cooperation (Gardin, Kaplan, Firestone, & Cowan, 1973; 
Wichman, 1972).  
Further investigation could seek to explore whether there are differences 
between experiences and processes in mild to severe nonclinical paranoia. Would value 
priorities change as a function of where an individual lies on the continuum of 
nonclinical paranoia? Would this have an impact on the role of power as a mediator 
between trait paranoia and PDG choice? Additionally, the current study could be 
replicated in clinical samples to establish whether the PDG paradigm is acceptable and 
valid as a marker for paranoia within samples that have severe delusions, and whether 
the values of people with such severe delusions are qualitatively or quantitatively 
different from those in nonclinical samples.  
 
4.3 Theoretical and Clinical Implications  
4.3.1 Nonclinical Paranoia: The Continuum Hypothesis 
The present study found comparable scores on the Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & 
Vanable, 1992) to that of the original paper. In this sample the mean PS score was 39.9 
(N = 221) compared to 42.7 (N = 581; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). This provides 
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additional empirical support for the burgeoning evidence base of the prevalence of 
nonclinical paranoia, and it’s relevance as a phenomenon of interest in its own right, 
and separate from clinical manifestations of persecutory delusions (Freeman, Garety, 
Bebbington, Smith et al., 2005). The results are also consistent with the increasingly 
regarded view that psychotic symptoms like those of persecutory delusions occur on a 
continuum of every day human experience (Freeman, Pugh et al., 2008; van Os et al., 
2009).  
 
4.3.2 Nonclinical Paranoia: Evolutionary Theory 
The high prevalence of nonclinical paranoia in the general population have promoted 
many theorists and researchers to understand why it is so common. Ellett et al. (2003) 
were the first to suggest that an evolutionary perspective may provide an explanatory 
framework; a theory which has now garnered considerable support elsewhere (e.g., 
Bebbington et al., 2013; Kelleher, Jenner & Cannon, 2010; Preti & Cella, 2010). Ellett 
et al. (2003) proposed from an evolutionary perspective that paranoia is a trait that was 
selected and distributed in humans due to its adaptive value. We are certainly obliged 
to make decisions to trust or to mistrust on a daily basis and individuals who are 
trusting, open and never suspicious of the intentions of others may end up as naive 
objects of exploitation (Bebbington et al., 2013; Ellett et al., 2003). Consideration of 
the potentially hostile intentions of others can be a highly intelligent and appropriate 
strategy to adopt in order to ensure personal safety, and the ability to reproduce. In this 
way paranoia may be seen as a by-product of a cognitive system designed to detect 
threat, since, from a survival perspective, it is much worse to fail to recognise a threat 
(such as a malevolent other) than to mistakenly believe them to be benevolent (Dodgson 
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& Gordon, 2009). The evolutionary maxim “better safe than sorry” might thus explain 
why clinical paranoia is so notoriously resistant to change and why even nonclinical 
paranoia, once triggered in experimental settings, can be persistent (Ellett & Chadwick, 
2007). Indeed, recent models by Morrison et al. (2011) have utilised this evolutionary 
conceptualisation of paranoia, as an evolved cognitive attentional response to the 
perception of interpersonal threat, to propose a metacognitive model of paranoia, based 
on Wells’ (1995) model of Generalised Anxiety Disorder. They also report that a high 
degree of positive beliefs about paranoia acted as a survival strategy. This predicted 
severity of paranoia in their sample indicating that this evolutionary framework has face 
validity. Consequently, wariness of the intentions of others may be adaptive in some 
situations, and becomes a clinical problem only when it is excessive, exaggerated, 
distressing or interferes with functioning (Bebbington et al., 2013). In evolutionary 
theory this is explained as an example of ‘cliff-edge’ fitness, whereby certain traits may 
increase fitness up to a critical threshold, but beyond this point, fitness falls 
precipitously (Nesse, 2004). In the case of paranoia this would be from the 
overestimation of risk (Freeman & Freeman, 2008). The amalgamation of evolutionary 
theory applied to a theory of paranoia in addition to the understanding of placing 
nonclinical and clinical paranoia on a continuum lends increased utility that the study 
of the nonclinical phenotype may hold the key to understanding the persistence of 
psychosis in the population and provide a new perspective on aetiology and treatment 






4.3.3 Nonclinical Paranoia: Clinical Implications 
The prevalence of paranoia in studies of the nonclinical population indicate that many 
people in the general population with delusions are not receiving assistance (Freeman, 
2006). Indeed, although not at the severity of delusions reported in the clinical 
population, delusions in the nonclinical population are still associated with many 
unhelpful emotional and social difficulties including reduced subjective wellbeing, 
anger and frustration (Ellett et al., 2003) and distress, feelings of powerlessness, social 
isolation and giving up enjoyed activities (Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith et al., 
2005). Although this requires more research, Freeman (2006) states this may qualify 
as an unmet clinical need and have published a self-help book for ‘Overcoming 
Paranoid and Suspicious thoughts’ aimed at individuals with nonclinical (and clinical) 
paranoia (Freeman, Freeman & Garety, 2008). Empirically it is known in the literature 
that paranoia is not confined to severe mental illness, but the publication of self-help 
books such as these help to consolidate this shift of knowledge and perspective into the 
general population. Findings from the current research can humbly offer support to this 
campaign to destigmatize paranoia, and free it from its associations with mental ill-
health (Ellett & Chadwick, 2007).  
This objective is especially important when the breadth and prevalence of 
stigma toward mental illness characterised by paranoia (namely psychosis) is known. 
Numerous quantitative and qualitative studies across the helping professions have 
shown that stigma towards individuals with psychosis is commonplace in members of 
the general population (Penn & Martin, 1998), and even within mental health 
professionals themselves (e.g., Faugier & Sargeant, 1997; Rao et al., 2009). This also 
crosses into stigma towards the families of those with a member with psychosis (e.g., 
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Schulze & Angermeyer, 2003) and even stigma targeted at the individual from their 
own family (e.g., Phelan, Bromet & Link, 1998). The role of the present research as 
contributory to a drive for less stigmatized views toward those who do experience 
persecutory delusions is also consistent with movements in mental health provision 
toward Recovery models for severe mental health (e.g., Anthony, 2003; Repper & 
Perkins, 2003) and wider psychological provision that focuses on social inclusion (e.g., 
BPS, 2008).  
In contrast to categorical views of psychosis that purport the experience as 
being qualitatively different from normal experiences, many treatment approaches to 
psychosis include a normalizing component aimed at educating the individual about 
dimensional views instead (Johns & van Os, 2001). This includes reducing self-stigma 
through imparting an appreciation of the symptoms of psychosis being present in those 
without a mental illness diagnosis, as well as laying them open to rational argument 
thereby bringing them into the realm of normal human experience. A normalizing 
approach is now common in Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT; Kingdon and 
Turkington, 1994) and modified CBT for Psychosis (CBT-P; Fowler, Garety, & 
Kuipers, 1995; Sensky et al., 2000) and has been shown in empirical trials to help 
individuals with psychosis (e.g., Kingdon and Turkington, 1991; Kingdon and 
Turkington, 1994; Sensky et al., 1998). The normalizing agenda was very prominently 
provided as an introductory framework for Freeman, Freeman et al.’s (2008) self-help 
book, including the research studies covered within this thesis and referencing the 
paranoid quotes of famous respected individuals, a tactic also employed in clinical 
literature (e.g., Sivec & Montesano, 2012). The ultimate aim of the integration of 
nonclinical paranoia research and treatment programmes for paranoia is summed up by 
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Ellett & Chadwick (2007) that the word ‘paranoia’ would not imply mental illness, but 
would rather describe an ordinary psychological process characterised by a perception 
of planned intention to harm by others. 
 
4.3.4 Values-Based Approaches to Paranoia: Clinical Implications 
A novel aspect of the current study was its attempts to make exploratory investigations 
into the role that values may play in paranoia. The findings suggest that individuals who 
value security and power through maintaining one’s public image and avoiding 
humiliation (face) have higher trait paranoia, and those who value acceptance and 
understanding for others (universalism-tolerance) report lower trait paranoia. 
Notwithstanding that these are initial results that require replication, and are cross-
sectional in nature, it is possible that incorporating an awareness of values may be a 
helpful additional component in our developing understanding of nonclinical paranoia. 
For example, reported paranoia may be reduced through strengthening the components 
of face, perhaps through reaffirming and exploring a strong sense of self, or perhaps 
through building greater acceptance and tolerance of others. Indeed, recent research in 
the nonclinical population has shown that if one has the opportunity of affirming values 
within environmental conditions (high self-awareness and task feedback) the 
occurrence of paranoid thoughts significantly reduces (Kingston & Ellett, 2014).  
 Including a values-based understanding of the factors involved in the formation 
of paranoia for those who report some level of distress is also in line with formulation-
based approaches in clinical mental health provision which aims to validate client 
experience (Corstens, Escher & Romme, 2008). Additionally, values-based approaches 
106 
 
such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) to psychological wellbeing have 
recently been shown to have promising beneficial results with individuals with 
psychosis (e.g., Bach, Hayes, & Gallop, 2012; Bach & Hayes, 2002; Gaudiano & 
Herbert, 2006; Oliver & Morris, 2013). Research into the efficacy of values-based 
approaches to psychosis are still in their infancy. As of such, no studies have portioned 
delusions from other psychotic symptoms, so it is currently unclear about the exact 
impact of that a values-based treatment approach would have specifically on delusions. 
However, these initial findings and their support from the present study to suggest a 
potential role for values in nonclinical paranoia suggests tentatively that a values-based 
approach to persecutory delusions may be efficacious. Additional research would be 
required to investigate this further, but could reported paranoia in clinical settings be 
reduced through strengthening the components of face, perhaps through reaffirming 
and exploring a strong sense of self, or perhaps through building greater acceptance and 
tolerance of others? It would be interesting to explore this within psychological 
interventions for individuals reporting persecutory delusions. The inclusion of 
measures of affective responses, such as anxiety, depression and self-esteem, could also 
be employed to more fully understand the processes by which strengthening an 
individual’s value system has its impact on reported paranoia.   
 
4.4 Strengths and Limitations 
It is important that the findings are considered within the context of the strengths and 





The study employed a cross-sectional design. By their nature cross-section 
studies cannot infer any causality between variables and caution is warranted in the 
interpretation of all data with this caveat in mind. Despite this, the use of cross sectional 
designs are the best way to determine prevalence and are useful at identifying 
associations that can then be more rigorously studied (Mann, 2003). Longitudinal 
research would be needed to explain the exact temporal relationship of variables and 
experimental methodologies would be needed to investigate any moderator or 
mediating variables.   
Following from this limitation, the present study was predominantly exploratory 
and sought to investigate novel areas of interest between nonclinical paranoia and 
values. Consequently, due to the large number of variables of interest already present 
in the analysis plan, the study design did not additionally include a measure of variables 
known to inter-relate to paranoia and persecutory delusions. As discussed in the 
Introduction (see Introduction, section 1.4, page 16) the role of anxiety has been 
demonstrated to be central to the formation and maintenance of persecutory delusions 
(e.g., Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith et al., 2005; Freeman et al., 2010; Freeman, 
Pugh et al., 2008; Freeman et al., 2012; Lincoln et al., 2008; Martin & Penn, 2001). 
Additionally, depression and self-esteem have also shown to be differentially 
associated with paranoia (Chadwick, Trower, Juusti-Butler, & Maguire, 2005; Ellett et 
al., 2003; Johns et al., 2004; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996; Martin & Penn, 2001; Trower 
& Chadwick, 1995). 
Because these affective processes were not included in the study design, the 
present study cannot provide comment on the potentially explanatory role that they may 
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play in understanding and interpreting the findings of this thesis. As a consequence, it 
would therefore be highly recommended that the next steps to develop research in this 
area include measures of affective responses, notably anxiety, depression and self-
esteem, as potential mediators or moderators to more comprehensibly elucidate the 
complex relationships between nonclinical paranoia, values and the use of the PDG.  
The final limitation to address in regard to the study design relates to the number 
of distinct and specific hypotheses that were provided. In light of the study being partly 
exploratory, as well as having some empirical and theoretical rationale on which to 
make predictions, a total of seven hypotheses were presented. Future research could 
advantageously streamline this number by focusing more on the exploratory sections 
of the thesis thereby reducing the number of specific predictions. Conversely, now that 
tentative associations have been established between nonclinical paranoia and values, 
fruitful future research could be more targeted on fewer, more robust, hypotheses.  
 
4.4.2 Sample 
The number of participants recruited to the current study exceeded the suggested 
number recommended by the a priori power calculation. This is indicative of a 
sufficiently powered sample enabling the detection of any effects that were present and 
the reduction in the likelihood of a Type II error occurring. In terms of limitations, the 
present study used an under optimal convenience sample (Barker et al., 2003), but 
benefitted from the cost and accessibility advantages that this sampling strategy 
afforded. The sample was also self-selected. Research using opt-in strategies have been 
said to include higher proportions of individuals with some level of psychological 
difficulty (Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith et al., 2005). That said, the present 
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study was advertised with no reference to psychological theory, and was instead 
advertised as a game of social strategy to reduce this effect. Secondly, the majority of 
the respondents were also students (n = 80%) who may be prone to overestimating the 
levels of delusional beliefs compared to samples drawn from the general population 
(Lincoln & Keller, 2008). This also may have the effect of reducing the generalizability 
of the current study to other samples. The current study did utilise a measure of trait 
paranoia designed specifically for use with student populations however, and a fifth of 
the respondents were not students which went some way to increasing the 
representativeness of the sample.  
A third limitation is that cultural differences within the current sample were not 
explored. An increased prevalence of paranoia in ethnic minority groups has been found 
at the more extreme end of the nonclinical continuum (Freeman et al., 2011). Samples 
representative of a broader mix of ethnicities may need to be specifically sought 
however, for example, the majority of the sample for the present study considered 
themselves to be White (n = 78%) with only small percentages of other ethnicities 
(Asian, n =15%; Mixed Heritage n = 7%). Lastly, only a brief screening question was 
used to ensure that this research sampled nonclinical paranoia. A more stringent 
methodology could have been applied such as using the Structured Clinical Interview 
for DSM-IV Axis II disorders (SCID-II; First et al., 1997) administered by trained 







A robust strength of the current research is the use of the PDG to offer objective 
observable behaviours not reliant on questionnaire data. It is also economical and quick 
to administer. Its versatility and utility is even more apparent when developed into an 
electronic format accessed online. A general criticism typically levied at the use of 
game theory in social research is its lack of ecological validity. The real-world value of 
findings from paradigms such as the PDG has been criticised due to the difficulties that 
many studies have in extrapolating their research from laboratory to real-world settings 
(Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). The present research does not suffer from this issue; instead, 
it sought to offer further support for the utility of the PDG to help measure and 
understand a real-world phenomenon; nonclinical paranoia. Game theory modelling is 
also held accountable for its perpetual inability to account for every set of variables that 
might influence strategy and outcome (Colman, 2003). In this respect there may have 
been a number of confounding, moderating or mediating variables that were not 
measured (or measured and not integrated into the analysis). A minor limitation is that 
no check was used to ensure that participants believed they were indeed playing another 
person. However, features of the online programme were designed to approximate the 
real-life experience of playing against another player such as incorporating time delays 
that ask the participant to ‘please wait while we find another 
player….searching…..searching’. Additionally, if this tenant had not been met we 
would predict floor scores on the SPS because it specifically asks participants to rate 
their experience of another player. That said, future studies that utilise the PDG in its 
versatile online format could include a simple Likert scale to ascertain if participants 
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did in fact believe they were playing against another person which would clearly 
eliminate this minor limitation of design validity.  
In terms of questionnaire measures, all self-report measures were carefully 
chosen for the purposes of the current study. There were some limitations however. As 
discussed previously (see Discussion, section 4.2.2, page 88) the hypotheses reliant on 
data from the SPS may have been undermined by the high modal score obtained from 
this sample. This tendency toward a distribution with positive kurtosis may have had 
the effect of obscuring any effects and increasing a Type II error.  Secondly, the present 
study utilised the PVQ-R (Schwartz et al., 2012) for data collection on values. This is 
the most recent questionnaire aimed at assessing Schwartz’s refined values theory 
(Schwartz et al., 2012). Although confirmatory factor and multidimensional scaling 
analyses do support the discrimination of the 19 values (Schwartz et al., 2012), full 
psychometrics for the PVQ-R are still currently being compiled (S. Schwartz, personal 
communication, May 30, 2014) which may reduce the validity of drawing conclusions 
from the present study.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Whilst acknowledging the limitations outlined, several conclusions can be drawn from 
the current study which include novel contributions to the literature. The present 
research provides additional support for Schwartz et al.’s (2012) refined theory of 
human values, which it did by exploring values theory in relation to the novel area of 
nonclinical paranoia. The findings indicate that higher trait paranoia is associated with 
valuing face, that is, holding a commitment to security and power through maintaining 
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one’s public image and avoiding humiliation, and lower trait paranoia is associated with 
valuing universalism-tolerance, that is, showing acceptance and understanding for 
others. Secondly, the current findings replicate that of Ellett et al. (2013) to show that 
distrust-based PDG competition is a behavioural marker for nonclinical paranoia. 
Additionally, the present research offers a secondary behavioural marker for 
nonclinical paranoia based on a commitment to valuing power. Collectively, the current 
findings provide further evidence for the role of the PDG in the measurement and 
investigation of nonclinical paranoia, and more specifically provide a foundation for 
further research into the role that values could play in furthering this understanding, 
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Welcome to the study! Please take a few minutes to complete the information below before 
you start.  
 
1.  Please enter your date of birth 
      
      * dd/mm/yyyy 
       
2.   Please select your sex 
  Male 
Female    
       
3.   Please select your employment status 
 Employed 
Unemployed      
  Full-Time Education   
          
4.    Please select your education status 
   O-Level/GCSE or equivalent 
 A-Level or equivalent 
 Degree or equivalent 
 Post-Graduate or equivalent   
         
5.   Which of the following best describe your ethnic group or cultural background? 
  White British 
 Any Other White British 
 Asian Background 
 African Background 
 Any Other Black Background 
 Mixed White British and Other 
 Mixed White Non-British and Other 









 6.   What is your religion? 
  Christian 
 Buddhist 
 Hindu   
  Sikh 
 Muslim  
  Jewish 
 Other 
 None    
      
7.   What is your marital status? 
 Single 
 Married or cohabiting 
 Widowed 
 Divorced 
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9.   Have you had previous contact with mental health services for personal reasons? 
 Yes 
 No 





Portrait Values Questionnaire – Revised (PVQ-R) 





















Paranoia Scale (PS) 















State Paranoia Scale (SPS) 











Closed Reasons Assessment 











































































'The study of decision making in a social context' 
Before you decide to take part, it is important for you to fully understand what the 
study involves and all relevant information. Please take time to read the following 
sheet carefully.   
  
 
1. What does the study involve? 
During the study you will be playing a short game against another randomly selected 
player. You will play between one and six rounds of this game. You will also complete 
five questionnaires. The game will be explained fully to you before you start and you 
will have a chance to practice before the game starts to ensure you understand the 
rules. The study will be completed online in one session. It is not possible to logout 
and then login again at a later point; you must complete the study in one go. 
Please allow 15-25 minutes to complete the study. 
2. Who is involved in this study? 
The principal investigator for this study is Jenna Williams, a Trainee Clinical 
Psychologist. Other investigators are Dr Lyn Ellett, lecturer in Clinical Psychology, and 
Dr Anat Bardi, senior lecturer in Psychology. All are from Royal Holloway University. 
3. Why have I been asked to participate? 
We are recruiting people aged between 18-65 to take part in the study. 
4. Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide to take part. If you do decide to take part in the study you will 
be asked to sign (online) a consent form to agree that you have read and understand 
the study information. 
5. Can I withdraw from the study? 
Yes, you can withdraw at any time even if you have already signed the consent form 
without giving a reason. The data you have supplied up to that point will be removed 
and won’t be used in the study. 
6. What are the incentives to complete the study? 
You will have the opportunity to win credits that you can trade in for a song of your 
choice online at the iTunes store. The amount of credits you earn will be determined 
by the choices you, and the other player make, when playing the game. The details of 
this will be explained in more detail before you start. 
7. Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
All information which is collected during the course of the research will be kept strictly 
confidential. The questionnaire scores and task data will be anonymised and stored 
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securely on a database. Only the researchers will have access to the information you 
give during the study. 
8. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are no known disadvantages or risks to participating in this study. However, if 
you do feel worse after taking part in the study and you feel you need some support to 
help with difficult emotions, please contact your GP and inform the principal 
researcher via email (see question 12 for details). The university also offers a 
counselling service or you may also wish to contact the Samaritans. 
Royal Holloway Counselling Service 
Website: http://www.rhul.ac.uk/ecampus/welfare/counselling/home.aspx  




Website: http://www.samaritans.org/  
Telephone: 08457 90 90 90 (UK) or 1850 60 90 90 (ROI) 
Email: jo@samaritans.org 
 
9. What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The research study will be written up and submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements of the Doctorate in Clinical Psychology. It is also proposed that the 
findings of the study will be written up and submitted to a peer-reviewed journal. If 
you are interested in hearing about the results and conclusions of the study, please 
inform the principal researcher via email who will send you a summary once the 
research is complete. 
 
11. Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed by the Royal Holloway University of London Department 
Ethics Committee. 
10. Who is organizing the funding of the research? 
The research is a requirement of Jenna Williams’ doctoral thesis as part of her training 
in Clinical Psychology. Her training is funded by Camden and Islington Mental Health 
and Social Care Trust. 
 
12. How can I get more information? 
Please do not hesitate to contact Jenna Williams, the principal researcher, via email 
should you need any further information about the study. You may also contact Dr Lyn 
Ellett.  
 
Jenna Williams: jenna.williams.2011@live.rhul.ac.uk 







       
   I have read and understood the information describing this study 
    
   I Understand 
    
    
   I am aged between 18 and 65 years old and freely consent to participate 
    
   Yes 
    
    
   I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time 
    
















'The study of decision making in a social context' 
Below is more information about the study that we could not tell you before you 
completed it as it may have affected the decisions you made during the study. Please 
read this information so you can decide whether you are still happy to take part. 
The study used some minor deception. You were made to think that you were playing the 
computer game against another player, when in actual fact you were playing against the 
computer which was pre-programmed. In addition, all participants in the study only 
played one round and received one iTunes voucher regardless of the choice they made 
on the game. The minor deception was necessary to investigate which strategy you 
would choose if you were playing for limited resources. 
The questionnaires that you completed looked at paranoia and the values that you hold. 
The aim of the research was to look at the relationships between paranoia, values, and 
the strategy that you adopted in the game. Your participation in this study will help our 
understanding of paranoia as it exists within the general population. 
Paranoid-like thoughts are a common everyday experience for many people and are not 
anything to worry about. If you do feel worse after taking part in the study and you feel 
you need help to manage difficult emotions please contact your GP and inform the 
principal researcher via email. The university also offers a counselling service or you may 
also wish to contact the Samaritans. 
Royal Holloway Counselling Service 
Website: http://www.rhul.ac.uk/ecampus/welfare/counselling/home.aspx  
Telephone: 01784 443 128  
Email: counselling@rhul.ac.uk  
Location: FW171 
Samaritans 
Website: http://www.samaritans.org/  
Telephone: 08457 90 90 90 (UK) or 1850 60 90 90 (ROI) 
Email: jo@samaritans.org 
Thank you for your participation in this research. If you have any further questions, 
please contact Jenna Williams via email on jenna.williams.2011@rhul.ac.uk. 
Having been fully debriefed about the aims and purpose of this study, I am happy for my 
data to be included in the study. 
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